Development of a Reference Design for a Cyber-Physical System by Blair, Nicholas Paul
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
ScholarWorks@UARK 
Theses and Dissertations 
7-2020 
Development of a Reference Design for a Cyber-Physical System 
Nicholas Paul Blair 
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd 
 Part of the Electrical and Electronics Commons, Power and Energy Commons, and the Systems and 
Communications Commons 
Citation 
Blair, N. P. (2020). Development of a Reference Design for a Cyber-Physical System. Theses and 
Dissertations Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/3821 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion 




Development of a Reference Design for a Cyber-Physical System 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 




Nicholas Paul Blair 
University of Arkansas 




University of Arkansas 
 
 




























The purpose of this thesis is to develop a reference design to assist in the selection of 
security practices in power electronics design. A prototype will be developed from this reference 
design for evaluation. This evaluation will include a brief cost/benefit analysis to gauge the 
efficacy of implementing each layer of security throughout the power electronics design process. 
This thesis will also describe the obstacles and effectiveness of integrating a Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) into a cyber-hardened grid-connected device. The TPM device is a secured 
crypto processor that assists in generating, storing, and restricting the use of cryptographic keys. 
The emphasis of this research is to establish integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality within a 
system by providing a baseline of security concerns for segments of the system. This research 
considers communication, control, and hardware level securities. The scope of this thesis will 
review the necessary security methods as well as consider the effects these methods have on the 
embedded system, to assess the desired security to responsiveness trade off. Applying this 
approach to a design process will alleviate various unknowns of appending security to a power 
electronics design.  
This thesis describes the specific vulnerabilities introduced within this grid-edge 
environment, and how the liabilities within the system can be mitigated. Initially, common 
security techniques will be considered to establish a guideline to benchmark performance and 
resource costs of the system. The foundation will be a non-hardened power electronic system 
platform with industry standard communication protocols. Several security techniques and attack 
vectors will then be evaluated to contribute to the base level platform. Other fail-safe features 
take place to gauge progress of the selected approach, non-inclusive to the TPM. Collectively, 
this investigation will determine a valid experiment by appraising and categorizing resource 
 
 
allocation, performance overhead, and monetary cost analysis results into a reference design. The 
prototype will then demonstrate methods to relieve common threats that are purposefully 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation  
In recent years, the residential market has seen substantial penetration of sophisticated 
power electronics devices which expose a considerable attack surface, particularly for the power 
grid. Predominantly, these grid-connected devices such as solar inverters and battery energy 
storage systems (BESS) have little to no security. Too often, security is an afterthought of the 
design process, provided it is even a consideration to begin with. With rapidly developing grid 
technologies and smart-grid communities, the demand for smarter distribution systems is 
increasing leading to the necessity of secure power electronic systems. Electric 
transmission/distribution systems in which we deploy new distributed energy resources must still 
meet changing consumer needs while constantly battling new regulations and being aged [1]. 
With these demanding considerations in mind, security requirements must be extensive to protect 
new systems being put in place and to avoid interfering with other issues with maintaining a 
reliable grid, which were previously discussed.  
Heightened grid complexity has a negative connotation because of increasing points of 
failure; however, smart power transmission systems provide more efficient and effective 
environments.  Intelligent devices within the grid provide more robust situational awareness 
which yields quicker reaction times for dynamic systems. Even so, concerns with operation 
security and reliability are drawbacks to consider [2]. An underlying goal of this research is to 
bridge the gap between the more secure methods of information technology (IT) and the newer 




Figure 1.1. U.S. annual installed DER power capacity additions by DER technology [4]. 
This reference development will allow further innovation with less constraint and hasten 
technological developments within the power industry; all while meeting requirements to ensure 
the safe execution and management of all user data.  This is particularly important to the field of 
Distributed Energy Resources (DER), considering the vast spread of these devices across a 
rapidly expanding market. As shown in Figure 1.1, the market will expand as much as 50% in 
the next five years. The existing complexity of modern system design can be egregious when 
considering all DER process variables. The desire of this work is to provide a design process that 
allows for rapid development in this field, as well as deliver different security options throughout 
the system design. 
1.2 Security Principles  
Security is a measurement of safety. This implies that if a system is thoroughly secure, 
then no undesired influence may have any impact on the system. That said, no security is 
absolute, no matter the intricacies of the solution. Therefore, not only is it critical to protect  
against outsider threats, but also to understand that an intrusion event is imminent, and one must 
have the capability to mitigate any adverse effects an intrusion may have on the system. Simply 
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put, a system must not exclusively consider if an event will happen, but when it will happen and 
how to stop the event from causing harm.  
In a cyber-physical system, the approach to security is relatively unique. Apart from 
being vulnerable to component failures, these systems are often predisposed to malicious attacks 
due to a direct opening to the once ignorant physical system created by the increase in 
communication and data flow now broadcasted to and from the device [3]. The proposed 
research investigates security from a layered perspective to the cyber-physical system. A layered 
approach considers security throughout the design phase rather than injecting security into a 
complete system. This aspect is critical to this approach due to the immature nature of merging 
IT and OT techniques to ensure protection at vital points of contact created using this method. 
Though immature and exposed, the operations coupling IT and OT will only become more 
prominent in the coming years [5]. This can be compared to any technological scramble to 
market; take smart phones for example. Like smart phones, this relatively new concept is rapidly 
pressing the market of distributed energy resources and expanding quickly, but without 
forethought on how to administer security to this field, these devices will succumb to the same 
setbacks. Many security exploitations became relevant to the attack surface, that is the smart 
phone platform, since this area had yet to be explored. Smart phones faced many new challenges 
with obstacles that could have been avoided with slightly more consideration to the security and 
the data that was to be protected. Challenges akin to infection of hostile, intrusive, or otherwise 
malicious software become far more significant to those whose livelihoods that depend on these 
resources [6, 7]. The residential and commercial markets both have substantial DER presence 
reported by the DOE and the More Than Smart working group: more than 42,500 MW of total 
distributed energy resources already established nationwide. Table 1.1. shows this on a state by 
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state breakdown and this is not even concerning those to come. Though slightly dated, this table 
alone shows the urgency to secure future devices  
  
Table 1.1. Distributed Energy Resources by State [5] 
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in this area and helps to better understand the need for this research.  The need for energy storage 
and electric vehicles is also scaling quickly, and the same security principles can be applied to 
these areas. Diligence is important in a rapidly growing industry such as this, and any 
complacency could be detrimental to the residential market and those who inhabit it.  
1.2.1 Security Modeling 
There are many ways to approach security to determine vulnerabilities within a system.  
Most common methods involve an arrangement of considerations relating to the threats and risks 
of vital system operations. These arrangements are called models which help to guide policies or 
distinguish potential risks to a system; generally, a good starting point when assessing probable 
points of interest during the design process. The significance behind this, regardless of what 
method is chosen, is the visibility into the device and the resources being used. More precisely, 
this gives foresight on what the system is committed to doing, while mapping out 
interconnections and communications within a design process before truly assessing threats. 
Different situations require specific measures when appending a security model, therefore 
various security assessments exist to help provide for the individual needs of most scenarios. 
Example standardized models include: CIA, STRIDE, DREAD, and Attack Trees. These models 
each focus on distinct aspects of exposure to a system, such as the STRIDE model; made as a 
mnemonic model by the Microsoft Corporation to identify computer security threats. The 
acronym defined in Table 1.2 considers threats associated with this model. Various other models 
exist to help define the risks and liabilities of cyber systems. Each model defines the approach 
differently, but the goals are all the same; to provide a proactive solution to understanding the 
vulnerabilities within a system and define countermeasures to nullify these exploits.  
6 
 
Table 1.2. STRIDE Threat Model 
S Spoofing Identity 
T Tampering with Data 
R Repudiation 
I Information Disclosure 
D Denial of Service 
E Elevation of Privilege 
 
1.2.2 Modeled with CIA Triad 
The model that will be considered for this research is the CIA model; sometimes 
identified as the AIC model as to avoid confusion with the Central Intelligence Agency. This 
model was designed specifically for organizations to guide policies for information security. 
Typically represented with a triangle, hence the name triad, emphasis within this research is 
focused on three key points in the acronym: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. Many 
standards and third parties have partnered to provide users with the ability to manage their own 
privacy, durability, and legitimacy based on this model [8]. Subsequently, this research has 
defined the terms to represent vulnerabilities to be addressed with a security-in-depth approach. 
Each term is described here and explained in further detail in the following sections of the paper. 
 Confidentiality is considered a method of security intended to control the access to 
information. This means to ensure sensitive data is only available to those with authorized 
privilege can access this data. Two-way encryption contributes to confidentiality by mapping 
symbols, letters, and figures arranged to represent plain text messages and is commonly used to 
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prevent unauthorized access to concealed data. Hashing, like encryption, is another algorithm 
used to arrange information into a fixed length format for confidentiality among other uses.  
 Data integrity aims to protect the data from modification or removal.  To do so, the data 
must only be modified by means that would not lead to system failure or as a baseline be 
recoverable. The idea is that one can trust the data that is in the system. If authentication is 
successful, the user must not be able to manipulate or interpret the data in a way that would be 
harmful to the user or system.  
 Lastly, availability is the most essential element in determining authorized users and the 
level of accessibility to the system. This component of the triad is focused on targeting hardware 
failures, power failures, and failovers to ensure that the data is attainable. Recovery is essential 
for the availability of data to stay accessible. In the event of data corruption, hardware failure, or 
malicious attack, the user and the system must still retain the ability to monitor and use the data 
as long as it can be trusted. A method to ensure the availability is to consistently backup critical 
data in a secured location secluded from the system. This guarantees that previous data can be 
accessed without worry of system level influence or interaction.  
1.3 Thesis Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate methods in which to incorporate security into a 
cyber-physical system, as well as perform a cost/benefit analysis on the described system to 
portray the effectiveness of each layer of security and categorize the costs associated with each 
addition. From this analysis, the expectation is to realize a reference design that provides support 
in securing the power electronics design process. This reference design will demonstrate what 
base level functionality within a system may look like, different layers of the system, and how to 
approach security at each layer. A portion of this thesis will focus on the benefits of utilizing the 
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Trusted Platform Module, one way it is specifically used within this system, and further 
capabilities of this module pertaining to security and system overhead. Experimental results are 
based on the mitigation techniques used in this analysis to determine the functionality of each 
method used. Other system design considerations will be described to explain the reason for 
choosing certain system components, attack scenarios, and mitigation techniques.  
1.4 Thesis Organization 
The composition of this thesis is arranged sequentially by chapter as listed:  
- Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the concepts associated with this research such 
as basic security principles, security models, the chosen approach, and objectives.  
- Chapter 2 provides an explanation of the background needed to understand the 
functionality of the cyber-physical system. This section also considers the integration 
of the TPM and how to further utilize the available resources for future development.  
- Chapter 3 details the remainder of the system with experimental setup to depict the 
mitigation strategies that can be applied to a cyber-physical system.  
- Chapter 4 presents a cost/benefit analysis of the mitigation techniques.  
- Chapter 5 defines the summarized conclusion and introduces potential future work. 
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CHAPTER 2  
BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction  
From Chapter 1, the motivation for this research is to implement layers of security within 
a cyber-physical device that will act as a model reference design. The device considered in this 
research is readying for a preproduction prototype, meaning that the controls and overhead are 
likely to become much more resource intensive due to complex secondary and tertiary control 
algorithms as well as protection schemes. To add, having each layer of security implemented in a 
singular location rather than placed throughout the architecture is not beneficial for reasons 
concerning basic security principles. These flaws in design display the need for a multi-level 
security architecture. The approach for the reference design architecture defines these layers and 
applies example securities that demonstrate protection against realistic threats.  
2.2 Cyber-Physical System 
A cyber-physical system is defined as the integration of computation, communication, 
and physical processes in order to complete various defined tasks. Analogous to the Internet of 
Things (IoT), specifically the Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT), these systems utilize a 
combination of actuators and sensors that communicate with control systems to operate certain 
physical procedures. Embedded control systems further consult with an elevated computing 
environment that monitors critical points within the system. There are considerable challenges 




Figure 2.1. Reference design architecture. 
 
requirements of the physical environment are fundamentally different from those same 
stipulations in computing [9]. Regardless of the challenges, the demand for such devices has 
grown exponentially as technology advances, and the importance for future growth is evident. 
For this precise reason, security will play an important role in cyber-physical systems, and this 
displays the need for implementing a reference design.  
In relation to the field of distributed energy resources, this research realizes a base 
architecture of the critical layers to consider within a device. These layers to be examined are 
labeled the communication layer, control layer, and the physical or hardware layer. This 
approach uses components from Figure 2.1 and structures these interconnected pieces as 

































vital components in the device, recognizing various risks in each layer, and how to address the 
foremost risks; all to define an outline for addressing vulnerabilities within a relatable system.  
For a proper understanding to recognize the physical makeup of the reference design 
architecture, the components within the system are displayed in Figure 2.2. The following 
sections will reference Figure 2.2 to help realize the physical attributes of each device as they are 
explained in further detail below. The components are numbered chronologically to show where 
each component resides in the setup in the following order: Raspberry Pi, Complex Programable 
Logic Device, Digital Signal Processor 1, Digital Signal Processor 2, Power Electronics 
Hardware, Hardware Authentication Module, and the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Each 
element listed will be described below when detailing the various layers.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Physical device architecture recognition. 
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2.2.1 Communication Layer 
Within a cyber-physical system, some form of communication typically exists in order to 
communicate aquired data out of the system to be processed and utilized. It is necessary to verify 
that the data reported from within the system is correct and realistic. This data provides growth 
for companies within the power industry and supports the development of a robust smart grid 
[10]. This happens by monitoring the data received from the system to address any needs or 
concerns from the system. Issues observed within the system can then be documented and 
counteracted by either correcting the issue in the current system with an update or the 
development of a new revision to correct the design will also suffice. Collecting and monitoring 
system data through communication allows for better data management, data analysis, 
visualization, and processing of the data. Figure 2.3 defines a generic communication method 
chosen to be used in the reference design. Like many other elements of this reference design, the 
components within each layer can be replaced with similar devices to better address the user’s 
needs. That is why this is considered a reference design. It grants the user the ability to conform 
to their own needs with the freedom to swap certain components for more suitable functionality. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Communication layer topology. 
  
The current reference design contains a communication layer consisting of the Trusted Platform 
Module, a Raspberry Pi, and an external communications device. Also, not shown in the diagram 
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is one other communication device termed an XPort ethernet module. Each of these components 
has an important role within the communication layer and will be described in more detail below.  
The primary component of the communication layer within the reference design is the 
Raspberry Pi. The Raspberry Pi is an embedded environment for the Linux operating system 
featuring multiple inputs and outputs for the user to interface with such as keyboard and mouse 
inputs for control and a display output, but more importantly direct access to the General Purpose 
Input/Output (GPIO) directly to the central processor. This provides direct communication with 
the processor over many standardized protocols in order to connect other devices such as the 
Trusted Platform Module for instance. For an idea of what the Raspberry Pi looks like, it can be 
seen in Figure 2.2. For a closer look, see Figure 2.4. The reasons for choosing the Raspberry Pi 4 
in this instance is due to the quad core Arm processor that houses the Linux kernel, Gigabit 
ethernet port, serial interface, and abundant support from documentation and the community.  
 
Figure 2.4. Raspberry Pi 4 Model B board layout. 
 Realistically, this portion of the reference design simply depends on any Arm processor 
platform that can support a Linux kernel. The Linux kernel here is the key component and the 
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Raspberry Pi architecture is designed for this. To elaborate on this concept, a kernel is the 
foundation of an operating system whereas an operating system is the software supporting the 
base computer functionality. For this reference design, a Raspbian operating system Linux kernel 
is used because it is open source and very well documented in capabilities, versatility, and 
support; though, any operating system could be used that contains similar functionality.  
 The purpose of this kernel is to accommodate the required communication link between 
the cyber-physical device and the outside world. This kernel provides an environment in which 
the system can execute programs for importing commands and exporting data, to and from the 
system. These programs are simply code that is executed within the device to serve various 
purposes such as gathering weather data and time of use pricing, hosting a web server, and 
addressing lower level registers in the system. Before accessing raw data, it must be scaled and 
formatted to be useful to the user. This formatting is done when addressing the lower level 
registers in the system. The data is manipulated and managed by a web server running within the 
system. The webserver acts as a hub to route important data to the appropriate destination. Here, 
the webserver can display the data in many ways to help the user visualize system states or 
operation of the system. The webserver also offers ease of access to the device through the 
external communication device which could be any remote terminal that has access to the 
network. This device could be any remote terminal connected to the same computing network as 
the Raspberry Pi. Since the primary access point to the device is through this connection, it is 
critical for this connection to be secure. The security methods used between the webserver and 




Figure 2.5. Lantronix XPort embedded ethernet module. 
Another communication method utilizing the previously mentioned XPORT module is 
available as an alternative to the webserver communication path. Figure 2.5 details the two 
communication protocol standards chosen for the reference design. These two are Modbus TCP, 
which is utilized through the XPort module, and Modbus RTU otherwise. The web server 
communicates to the lower level control layer via a serial interface using the Modbus RTU 
protocol while the XPort supports the Modbus TCP protocol to communicate system information 
to the remote terminal. The remote terminal can also relay system commands back to the XPort 
module to be converted into Modbus RTU over serial back to the system. This decision on which 
communication type to depend on is made within the control layer. Even so, the control layer 
must only standardize on the Modbus RTU protocol and if the access is requested over Modbus 
TCP, then the XPort will handle the protocol translation.  
Lastly, the final element within the communication layer is the Trusted Platform Module, 
also known as the TPM. The TPM will be reintroduced in section 2.3 to be covered in extensive 
detail. For now, it is worth noting another key reason for choosing a Raspberry Pi was support 
for the Optiga TPM SLI 9760 evaluation board manufactured by Infineon. A snippet of the 








Figure 2.6. Optiga TPM SLI 9670 development board 
board for the design hastened the development process substantially. Ideally, this TPM would 
rest on the control board layer to be connected directly to the communication bus to provide 
support in a full production model, however, this board was used for rapid protype development 
with the ability to neglect appending additional components on the control layer. Interfacing with 
the control layer would take more time to develop for considering a controller would also need to 
be developed within the CPLD using VHDL to be able to communicate with this device. Also, 
the Application Programming Interface (API) developed for this board utilized the Serial 
Peripheral Interface (SPI) protocol for which it is much easier to develop, given the team 
background.  
2.2.2 Control Layer 
The control layer is put in place to manage the behavior of the hardware devices within 
the cyber-physical system. This layer acts as a medium in order to facilitate the communication 
layer commands to the actuators, which are in the hardware layer. In addition, the control layer 
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reports sensor data coming from the hardware layer back through the communication layer for 
 
Figure 2.7. Control layer topology. 
monitoring. The control layer can be completely autonomous or it can actuate from input 
commands. Regarding the cyber-physical reference design, this layer handles a combination of 
taking input commands for reference as well as autonomously following the reference through 
control system feedback. For any complex control system of a physical system, the autonomous 
control method uses feedback from the sensor data in order to maintain set output values (i.e. 
voltages and currents). The hardware control methods used within this research relate to power 
electronics hardware such as ac inverters, dc/dc converters, power regulators, and battery energy 
storage. To determine how these methods are used, the specific reference design control layer 
needs to be explained further. 
 The design illustrates the control layer with one Complex Programmable Logic Device 
(CPLD) and two Digital Signal Processors (DSP) as seen in Figure 2.7. A closeup of the control 
board can be seen in Figure 2.8. To further read about these processors, one may read sources 
[12] and [13]. The role of the DSP is to directly control the behavior of the power electronics. 
Particularly, for this cyber-physical system, a 3-phase inverter is receiving power from a Direct 
Current (dc) link and is providing a sinusoidal 3-phase Alternating Current (ac) output. The 
hardware description will be reintroduced in the next section in more detail. For now, all that 
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needs to be understood is that the DSP is in control of directing the power flow and reading 
measurements from the sensors. The DSP receives this sensor data through a control loop. Even 
though the complexity of the pre-production prototype controls constructed from similar control 
designs will increase as a result of incorporating secondary and tertiary control algorithms, the 
power flow will be further optimized. This displays the growth capability within the reference 
design. There is sufficient processing capability to handle advanced control system models, as 
long as the appropriate power electronics hardware is considered within the hardware layer of the 
design.  
 The CPLD considered in this reference design is an extremely fast integrated circuit that 
is a derivation of the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). Typically, a CPLD can have 
anywhere from a thousand to ten thousand gate arrays, whereas FPGAs are known to have tens 
of thousands to millions of gate arrays on a single chip. Though FPGAs seem to be much larger, 
CPLDs are more economically efficient, and they can be much faster when considering 
execution and boot times. FPGAs require more interconnections which can lead to more 
flexibility in design choices but are more complex to design. CPLDs are architecturally simple 
compared to the FPGA, which allows for greater speeds. One important role for the CPLD in the 
reference design is to supply access to the gate array as a routing fabric for the digital signals in 
the system. In other words, all digital signals being transported through the control layer must 
travel to the CPLD. The CPLD then decides where to route each signal. Analog signals must be 
manually routed through the platform, as the CPLD does not support the routing of continuous 
signals. Routing each digital signal through the CPLD opens the reference design to a wide 
variety of functions. Some functions currently implemented have been described above. By 
routing communication signals through the CPLD, the ability to physically reroute and sever 
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communication signals based on predetermined conditions is available. This functionality is 
critical to the reference design control layer and will support many more functions which also 
allows for modularity. In Figure 2.8, the trapezoidal daughter boards serve many functions, and 
all follow the same standardized pinout. This allows for almost limitless expansion capabilities 
that would simply require a sensor/actuator daughter board design. That design could then attach 
to the controller board to enhance functionality and meet the needs of any user.  
 
Figure 2.8. Reference design controller board. 
2.2.3 Hardware Layer 
The hardware or physical layer of the device is the power electronics system, composed 
of all sensors and actuators in contact with the control layer of the cyber-physical system.  The 
sensors within this system are voltage and current sensors set up throughout the power 
electronics, in order to monitor the system as well as provide feedback to the active control 
systems in the control layer. Actuators in this context could be the 3-phase motor, acting as a 
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load, while the power electronics within this platform are responsible for converting the control 
signals into the necessary output to drive this load. To further explain the hardware, the design of 
the power electronics evaluation board (PE-EVAL board) will be described in this section.   
 
 
Figure 2.9. Hardware layer topology. 
The sensors in the hardware layer are also reporting back to the DSP. The DSP has 16 on-
board Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) inputs that allow for an analog signal, such as a 
voltage, to be converted into a scaled digital signal. This shows how the sensory data is carried 
out of the hardware layer. On the output of the 3-phase inverter, the grid connects to the device. 
This is where more complex control strategies could consider different modes of operation, such 
as islanded mode, grid feeding mode, and grid forming mode.  
The breakdown of the PE-EVAL board has three separate topologies: a buck converter, 
boost converter, and a 3-phase inverter. For this reference design, only the 3-phase inverter is 
considered to be the hardware layer. This is for simplicity when denoting attack vectors on the 
system, however, these security principles can be applied to many power electronic scenarios. 
The PE-EVAL board can be seen in Figure 2.10. This is an arbitrary hardware topology selected 
because this design was considered when the controller architecture was designed. The 
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remainder of the power electronics design, that is not directly associated with the attack vectors, 
will not be discussed to avoid complexity and confusion.  
 
Figure 2.10. PE-EVAL board. 
2.3 Trusted Platform Module 
The Trusted Platform Module, also known as a TPM, is a microcontroller for imparting 
hardware authentication and tamper protections into a system. This module was created by the 
Trusted Computing Group (TCG), an international standards body of approximately 140 





Figure 2.11.Components of the TPM [1]. 
 trusted infrastructure requirements, APIs, protocols necessary to operate a trusted environment, 
and trusted modules for other devices [1]. This integrated circuit comes well documented with 
the TPM 2.0 Library specification that has become an international standard administered by 
ISO/IEC JTC 1.  
The TPM architecture, simplified in Figure 2.11, is comprised of a plethora of security 
modules such as non-volatile secure storage, secure platform configuration registers, a hardware 
random-number generator, hash, and isolated key generation and key storage. These 
functionalities can provide cryptographic keys, prevent private keys from being exported, protect 
























boot process to protect against malware and attacks [1]. Each of these features are effective 
functions that can be utilized for security purposes before considering that the integrated chip is 
isolated from the system. Some features are worth noting and are described in more detail below.  
Within distributed energy resources, cryptographic keys provide data access to users who 
possess certain credentials or attributes. In this case, the method for enforcing such policies is to 
employ a trusted server to store the data and mediate access control between the user and server 
[2]. Common practice exercises the encryption process and key storage on these mediums. 
Although encrypted, these keys still reside on a shared local storage within the system. If the 
mandating server is compromised or physically jeopardized, a malicious entity could 
theoretically decipher the keys and decrypt the secured data if given enough time. The TPM 
improves on this process by physically isolating a portion of the cryptographic key within the 
hardware cryptographic module. In the case the event that the server is compromised, the TPM 
ensures that the attacker cannot gain access to the other portion of the encrypted private keys.  
Various standard encryption practices for securely preserving keys and decrypted data 
rely on volatile memory while plaintext portions are loaded into cryptographic algorithms. This 
means that the private keys are subject to memory disclosure attacks that read unauthorized data 
from RAM. These attacks can be accomplished through software methods even if the integrity of 
the system’s executable binaries is maintained, the Open SSL Heart Bleed attack for example. 
Physical attacks are also a potential threat, such as cold-boot attacks on RAM chips, even if the 
system is completely safe from software vulnerabilities [3]. Secure non-volatile storage helps 
alleviate this issue by ensuring that entire encryption process, including the storage of the RSA 
private keys, is completely secluded from the system.  If the system is compromised, there is no 
risk of losing the stored private keys, since they are permanently attached to the TPM, and 
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cannot be exported, even as cyphertext.  Therefore, this method blocks the attacker from gaining 
access to the keys in any way.  
An additional core component required for adequate cryptography is a Random Number 
Generator (RNG). A random number generator is an instrument used to randomly generate 
strings of unpredictable numbers and symbols.  These devices are not exclusive to cryptography, 
but are included in simulation environments, statistical sampling, stochastic optimization 
methods and image authentication watermarking. Within a software environment, a random 
number generator can be very close to random, but never truly random; namely, a Pseudo 
Random Number Generator (PSNG). PSNGs generate numbers that may seem random but are 
procedurally generated and can be recreated if the previous state of the PRNG is determined. 
This is inadequate for an effective cryptographic processor because the security of cryptographic 
algorithms depends on generating secret strings of data which are generated by RNGs to create 
cryptographic keys. To ensure that an RNG is secure, the output must be unpredictable and 
statistically indistinguishable from a true random sequence [4]. True Random Number 
Generators (TRNGs) are found to be stochastic and the same output cannot be intentionally 
reproduced. This is typically done by measuring a physical abnormality that is decidedly 
random. A trivial example could be electrical noise measured and polled to generate symbols 
based on the unpredictable noise with theoretically infinite entropy. Utilizing this method to 
generate cryptographic keys for encryption and secure storage cannot be intentionally recreated 
from another source, making the TRNG the ideal solution. 
Lastly considered, the hardware hash is another distinct component that proves the TPM 
useful in contrast to a software solution. A hash is a hardware ID that is distinct to the individual 
device.  The hardware ID typically contains information about the system, such as device serial 
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numbers, hard drive serial numbers, model numbers, and the manufacturer. These are some 
characteristics that could be described in a hardware hash, but not limited to these variables. The 
key here is to store information that is indicative of the device and could be used to uniquely 
identify this device [5]. For this use case, this feature is utilized for what is called remote 
attestation [6]. Remote attestation specific to this case would require a SHA-256 hash on the 
known hardware information at the time of startup. This hash is unique, meaning that no other 
input to this hashing algorithm could resolve to an identical output. Once the hash is complete, it 
is then compared to the next hash calculated on system startup. If the hash algorithm does not 
report the exact product as the previous calculation, then it is understood that the hardware has 
been tampered with. This protection contributes to system integrity in this case. This method is 
put in place to recognize any changes to the system to protect against any malicious additives.  
Due to the increasing system complexity as the prototype develops, it is beneficial to 
offload portions of the security to help better the future overall utilization of the system, as well 
as providing a physical isolation provided with these types of hardware protections. As 
previously mentioned, the TPM provides many hardware security features useful to a full 
production model while taking a portion of the task handling away from the control system 
required for basic functionality. Though the current reference design does not utilize the full 
computing potential of the system, a more rigorous load on a production model could see 
performance benefits as well as enhanced security.  
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CHAPTER 3  
TEST SETUP AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the vulnerabilities within the cyber-physical 
reference design and deploy mitigation strategies. The intent is to apply the results of this 
reference design prototype to a metric that will analyze the importance of each technique to 
gauge the impact it may have on the system. Before that happens, risks must be addressed within 
each layer of the design to identify the correct mitigation strategies that could be applied to the 
available attack surface. The base reference design does not contain any security features, which 
exposes the system to outsider threats. To protect these openings from malicious intent, the 
openings must first be discovered by determining which data or operations are valuable to the 
system. If the data is considered essential for operation, chances are that an attacker will be able 
to exploit this data against the user. It is important to realize where these weaknesses exist in the 
system in order to protect against them. Finding the exposures in the system defines the attack 
surface, where one can establish corrective measures to combat these deficiencies. Particular to 
the reference design mentioned, the test setup will elaborate on the attack surface considered and 
the approach taken to alleviate defined concerns. Every layer considered will have specific 
obstacles that require various levels of attention, which are determined by the significance 
behind each level being compromised. This will classify considered threats, determine what a 
malicious attack might look like, and measure, to what degree, it will affect the system.  
3.2 Communication Layer Assessment and Results 
As mentioned in the introduction, to prepare any layer for test, an assessment must be 
performed to understand the system and its vulnerabilities. The communication layer 
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encompasses all contact dealt outside the system, where much of this interaction occurs within 
the Raspberry Pi. Logically, this makes sense, considering the intention of installing the 
Raspberry Pi into the reference design was primarily to disclose information from the system. 
However, knowing that the attack surface within this layer consists of the Raspberry Pi, the next 
step is to learn the vulnerabilities of this portion of the system; namely, how important roles in 
this layer can be at risk of being attacked. Referenced in Chapter 1, the CIA Triad can contribute 
to discerning what threats are necessary to protect against. The confidentiality of the data is the 
greatest concern because the data could be used against the user in the event of exposure. Put 
simply, the confidentiality of the communication layer is the first step into realizing the 
vulnerabilities brought by disclosing sensitive information.  
Cyber-physical systems rely on communications as a large portion supporting the 
functionality of the system. It is imperative that data traverse in and out of the system layers to 
function properly. That said, the user must prohibit interaction of this data with an assailant, or 
the data may be taken and manipulated to be exploited against the user. Once the attack surface 
is identified, understanding how to protect certain data and communication paths is done by 
realizing the vulnerabilities of the attack surface. To help determine how the data is at risk, the 
storage and transmission medium are decided to be an influential point of contact for malicious 
activity. Namely, how the data is being sent and stored must be protected. Due to the webserver 
being the main point of contact from outside the system, it was decided to direct the attack vector 
towards the outgoing communication path of the system, directly from the Raspberry Pi. To 
enhance visualization of the communication path in the test setup, Figure 3.1 will illustrate the 




Figure 3.1. Communication path diagram. 
Confidentiality is a concern in many areas of communication security and cyber-attack 
methods that target and identify data in a system. There are many attack scenarios, or attack 
vectors, to consider; however, this reference design has decided to focus on two critical attack 
methods for the communication layer. These two attacks are Man-in-the-Middle attacks and 
Password Attacks, or password cracking. Other possible attack scenarios to be addressed can be 
considered for other design implementation. These are common attack categories when 





















server and another endpoint device; whether it be a utility/client handled interface or data 
storage. Man-in-the-Middle attacks typically focus on any data that can be intercepted between 
the web server and an endpoint [3]. A password hack can take this approach one step further by 
“sniffing” for specific details (i.e. user credentials) when using a Man-in-the-Middle attack.  
Initially, to secure this communication pipeline to the user interface, the SSH or Secure 
shell protocol was to be used for the user to access the web server from a remote terminal. Once 
implemented, this created a secure pipeline into the raspberry pi, where the web server is 
running. The TPM would then oversee encrypting this communication algorithm, while device 
communication was dormant. This implementation had a couple drawbacks to be considered. 
First, the SSH tunnel is secured in a similar manner to other transport layer protocols, such as 
TLS; however, this would grant the end user far too much access to the system outside of the 
web server. This is not recommended. If the authentication fails, an unauthorized user will have 
much more access to the system, which is not desired for malicious individuals. Secondly, this is 
a reference design meant for a power electronics engineer that is looking to develop production 
hardware, such as a commercial solar inverter. Having to log into the system, to manually run 
programs required to start the server, would be simple to a developer that is familiar with the 
backend, but this is not a practical production method. Also, the TPM was not being fully 
utilized, as it was only being used during down time. No end user would necessarily have the 
knowledge or the desire to deal with such maintenance overhead with a product. It simply is not 
enticing as a selling point and has little marketable value.  
Alternatively, the web server requires remote access, to multiple users, that does not 
relinquish administrator access to the entire system. Using SSL, or Secure Sockets Layer, the 
traffic to and from the Raspberry Pi would be encrypted using TLS v1.3. This method is like 
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SSH encryption, in that the communication path is completely secure; however, this method only 
pushes requested data that the web server permits. The SSL link communicates directly with the 
web browser which can be used on multiple platforms by the end user, to access the data and 
control the system. Standard websites can be accessed through the web browser by a Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) link which is strictly an application layer protocol. With SSL, the 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) can be utilized to meet the TLS v1.3 standard. 
Using this method, the user is restricted from any content that the web server does not wish to 
publish outside of the system.  
3.2.1 Web Server Implementation Overview 
As mentioned in the previous section, the web server within the communication layer is 
one way in which the control layer can communicate information to the computer interface.  
Running the server on a Raspberry Pi 4 was a choice made for easy connectivity to the TPM. 
This decision was also made to host a Linux kernel, using a Raspberry Pi 4, for connecting an 
Apache HTTP server, that hosts the back end, with the Django web framework, which is in 
charge of the higher level web design [3, 4].  The web server interface can be viewed in any 
modern web browser such as Safari, Firefox, and Google Chrome. A preview of the web server 
user interface can be seen in Figure 3.2. The data shown in the interface is split into two different 
types: read and write variables. The read only variables are considered to simply be sensory data. 
This is data that you would never need to manually manipulate such as voltage and current 
readings. On the other hand, write variables are the control parameters that are put in place to 
manage the system in real time. These variables consist of the switching frequency, PI gain 
parameters, ac amplitude and frequency, and other parameters.  Because the use of Django is 
incredibly versatile, the web interface is very flexible in that the developer has almost limitless 
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potential as to what data they want to display to the end user. An example of this is a simple 
graph, also depicted in 3.2, displaying the power over time plot. As long as data is accessible, the 
web interface can be built to incorporate new information. Django, as well as Apache, will be 
discussed in more detail below.   
 
Figure 3.2. CSPR web server user interface. 
 The two main components, Apache and Django, are critical to communication and 
displaying material to the end user. Apache is an HTTP server host for modern operating systems 
that meets current HTTP standards. There are many standard configuration parameters that allow 
for complete control of the server. Where security is concerned, the Apache server also has an 
HTTPS configuration being utilized in this system. This configuration adds additional security 
by protecting the user and server communication from attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attacks 
or password sniffing, using certificate authority and enhanced TLS v1.3 encryption. In typical 
HTTP traffic, all communication is sent over as unencrypted data, also known as plain text. This 
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means that anyone with access to that line of communication, another user on the network for 
example, could interpret this data without any additional difficulty. To show an example of this, 
a test was initiated to try and obtain the credentials of a user logging in to a web server using a 
basic HTTP connection. In order to gain access to the web server data, the user must login, with 
approved credentials, to the main webpage. To capture network data, Wireshark v3.2.4 was used. 
Wireshark is a widely used network protocol analyzer that allows the user to monitor network 
activity at a very low level. This enables the network traffic to be monitored down to each 
induvial packet. Since the initial data was not protected by HTTPS, the account username and 
password were easily discovered in the network traffic. This test can be depicted in Figure 3.3. 
The highlighted regions show the starting and endpoint destinations as well as a verification of 
the HTTP protocol being used. Also highlighted below is the HTTP packet payload, which is 
comprised of the username “admin” and password “password”; each being unencrypted. 
 To prevent this issue, the Apache server will shift to the HTTPS, or SSL, configuration. 
In order to utilize the Apache SSL configuration, the server will first need to generate an SSL 
certificate. An SSL certificate is a file that typically resides on the server, hosting the website. 
This SSL certificate will also enable the SSL/TLS encryption as a result of holding the public 
key, and other important information to the web server. One drawback to normal server SSL 




Figure 3.3. HTTP packet Wireshark monitor. 
If an assailant were to compromise the server SSL certificate, the attacker may gain unrestricted 
access to the system, as well as access to other users. To secure this certificate, the certificate can 
be stored in or protected by the TPM. Infineon claims, the greatest strength to the TPM is to 
enable an application the use of cryptographic keys, while keeping them safe within the TPM. It 
can both generate and import externally generated keys. Each key has individual security control, 
which could be a password or also an enhanced authorization policy. These keys can then be 
certified by the TPM and used to certify other keys as well. But in order to manage internal 
memory efficiently, the TPM has the capability to wrap keys (encrypt) within the parent key and 
store them (the encrypted key) outside the TPM, while maintaining the overall security of the 
system. When it is time to use the key, the key is loaded back into the TPM. Only the specific 
TPM used to wrap the key can unwrap and use it. To establish a TLS session between a client 
and server with OpenSSL and TPM2-TSS engine, one must create an Open SSL configuration 
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file. This file will have the configuration used to create the Root Certificate Authority (rootCA), 
server, and client certificates [5]. One can now create a Root CA which would establish a chain 
of trust to the end user, allowing for the secure connection between certificate authority and end 
users.  
 
Figure 3.4. TPM 2.0 key wrapping [5]. 
 Once the key has been generated and used to create the OpenSSL server certificate, the 
server can fully utilize the SSL configuration to host an HTTPS web server. The beginning of the 
session flow will show client and server greetings and acknowledge the key exchange. This can 
be viewed in Figure 3.5. Stated previously for this implementation, the focus is less on how the 
communication happens, but more on the confidentiality of the communication. Here, the TPM 
is an added layer of security, but not fully necessary to realize basic confidentiality of the HTTP 
packets. Regardless, the next step is to verify that this method can properly converse data to the 
end user without revealing information along the transmission path. To test this, a similar setup 
to the previous HTTP packet sniffing test was enacted, aiming to determine the contents of the 
packet payload. The same login process being tested was considered for the HTTPS service, as 
was HTTP. The results remained that each TLS packet was illegible, as expected.  Seen in Figure 
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3.6. HTTPS packet Wireshark monitor, the user and endpoint address locations are the same as 
before, but now the packet type is TLS v1.3, encrypting the entire packet. The further 
highlighted section displays the properly encrypted payload with no legible login information 
confirming confidential communications.  
 




Figure 3.6. HTTPS packet Wireshark monitor. 
3.3 Control Layer Assessment and Results 
Through this assessment of the control layer, the most critical concept to consider is 
maintaining the integrity of the control layer throughout the design process. The chosen area of 
focus is the DSP where all the power electronic controls are physically operating. To maintain 
this integrity means to keep the data free from corruption. In order to do this, the system must be 
monitored for what is considered “bad data” and compared to what is believed to be “good data.” 
The system has current and voltage sensors that are measuring components of the 3-phase 
inverter in order to monitor the system health. The current and voltage sensors values are 
delivered to the control system through Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADC). As the name states, 
the ADC converts the analog voltages from the sensors to a 12-bit binary number stored within 
registers on the DSP, by successive approximation. More on how successive approximation 
works in [6]. With this value, the voltages can be compared digitally to one another for a system 
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health assessment. If the assessment fails to meet expected benchmarks, the system can be 
disconnected, or turned off, to prevent damage. This is whether the damage is from malicious 
intent or mechanical hardware failure.  
For this test, the phase-A voltage is monitored under normal 3-phase load conditions. To 
obtain power flow, in this case, a low voltage 3-phase motor is acting as the load to achieve a 
constant 3-phase output. Once power is flowing, the voltage can be monitored and saved as a 
known legitimate value for comparing against unwanted measurement conditions. Measurements 
during test are polled by the ADC rapidly, but only saved periodically when each Modbus packet 
is transmitted, in order to insert a small delay to account for voltage noise transients. This is done 
for a couple reasons. The first reason being code simplicity that will require less system 
interrupts. Secondly, the Modbus transmission time is defined and can change to meet the needs 
of the system. Once polled, the value is stored in a register until the next cycle. When the 
measurement reoccurs in during the next cycle, the value is stored in another concurrent register 
to compare the current and previous voltage values. This is a similar approach to what some 
consider “de-bouncing.” Essentially, the purpose of this method is to verify that the voltage has 
maintained it’s value for some period longer than noise transients would typically occur. This 
technique will help rule out false positive evaluations on poor voltage readings.   
The system will rule that a bad condition has occurred when three consecutive hazardous 
voltage readings have been interpreted. If this occurs, the voltage amplitude will be commanded 
to zero, for the output of each phase. Following the test, the data was collected and can be 
observed in Figure 3.7. The beginning of the phase-A voltage output reading is observed as a 
typical ac sinusoidal waveform. This ac output voltage is directly related to the dc link input 
voltage of the inverter. Rather than feeding the ADC faulty data, the dc link input voltage was 
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incremented to physically step up the output voltage, and push the ADC reading out of a 
decidedly valid boundary. The results of this can also be seen in Figure 3.7 where the voltage is 
commanded to zero on the phase-A voltage leg. Do note that the output capacitor voltage takes 
time to bleed off into the load, which is the reason there is not an instantaneous jump to zero 
volts.  
 
Figure 3.7. Phase-A voltage cutoff. 
 During the invalid output condition, it is important to note that the amplitude is simply 
commanded to zero, rather than the system being completely shut down. This can be verified in 
Figure 3.8, showing that low voltage switching noise can be seen once the output is commanded 
to zero. The system is not shut down entirely so that the other essential components can continue 
to be monitored, or changed, to combat the system failure, malicious or not.  Once the output is 
commanded to zero, corrective measures can be taken to verify the state of the system and the 
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output. Whereas, if the entire system went without power, the system would possibly need to be 
isolated from the circuit before evaluation under safe operating conditions.  
 
Figure 3.8. Phase-A low voltage output switching. 
3.4 Hardware Layer Assessment and Results 
The leading focus of the hardware layer assessment will be the availability of the 
hardware. Meaning, that the hardware needs to be safe from defects or compromised controls. 
The chosen attack vector will target shoot-through currents on the individual legs of the inverter. 
The mitigation strategy of choice is forced dead band to employ shoot-through protection. Shoot-
through occurs when two adjacent switches are active concurrently, resulting in a short circuit 
across the dc link. This is a key challenge when designing an effective protection approach, 
because the short circuit loop must be blocked in a very short time period, 3 to 10 µs [7]. A 
standard 3-phase inverter is shown in Figure 3.9, where the shoot through current can be 
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observed through leg one of the inverter, possibly destroying switch S4. The high current often 
comes from the dc link capacitor in parallel with the dc voltage source, which has stored energy 
that is now shorted across the switching leg. Typical shoot through current, seen longer than 10 
µs, can be fatal to the switches as they are not made to handle that much current instantaneously.  
 
Figure 3.9. Basic 3-phase inverter topology. 
 To protect against shoot through currents, most control systems implement dead time. 
Dead time is the time in between switching periods where neither switch is conducting, as to not 
short circuit the dc bus to ground. Ideally, the switches turn on and off instantaneously, but this is 
not the case in practice. Ideal dead time effect can be seen in in Figure 3.10. A diagram of more 
accurate switching period waveforms can be seen in Figure 3.11. To learn more about the dead 
time effect, [8] does a good job of explaining the fundamentals when applied to a standard 3-




Figure 3.10. Dead time effect. 
 
Figure 3.11. Accurate on/off delay wave forms. 
Though, programming for dead time is standard practice in control systems, the present 
focus is to secure the availability of the hardware layer, even if the control layer is compromised. 
Presume that the control layer is compromised, and the user has malicious intent to remove the 
deadtime from the control system programming. There is a need for infrastructure in place that 
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will protect against this problem. The method utilized in this design relies on the CPLD to 
instantiate hardware interlocks, in order to force the signals opposite from one another. This 
implies that a malicious user, even removing dead time completely to command all gate signals 
active, will not be able to force a shoot through current.  
To test this method, the CPLD was programmed using VHDL to instantiate the circuit 
within the CPLD hardware. Stated in Chapter 2, all digital signals to and from the DSP are 
routed through the CPLD. Rather than having to design a new Printed Circuit Board (PCB) 
layout whenever the topology changes, the digital signals are routed to their destination through 
the CPLD architecture. Since obtaining worst case results, as well as verifying the 
implementation of this method, could result in a shoot through current, it was decided that a test 
bench should be built to prove this new method. A shoot through current at any operating voltage 
could be detrimental to the power electronics hardware, and it was decided to avoid any 
catastrophic consequences to the system. The test bench contains pseudo PWM waveforms that 
represent the controlled switching signals, sent out to the gate drivers.  This test bench was then 
simulated against the running CPLD code, where the results showed adjacent switches had gone 
into the same state, and the output sent to the gate drivers was then turned off. These results can 
be seen in Figure 3.12. This verifies hardware protection by having outputs switch low much 
faster than 10 us, even without deadtime. This is not protecting against active uptime. This 
method is more focused on the overall availability of the power electronics by removing the 





Figure 3.12. CPLD shoot-through protection simulation. 
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CHAPTER 4  
COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
4.1 Introduction 
Cost-benefit analysis is an organized approach to determine the strengths and weaknesses 
within any process. This method examines features within an initiative to appropriately gauge the 
expenses required to incorporate these features. Attributes are categorized by economical and 
performance costs, to realize the advantage of including these attributes, compared to how 
greatly these features contribute to the efficiency of the operation. In other words, the goal is to 
determine, to what degree, each proposed strategy will benefit the program, and the cost of each 
implemented strategy, respectively. The usefulness of this analysis is in its ability to accurately 
place value on components within a system. In the event that one cannot afford all the elements 
of a design process due budget constraints, this process allows for one to then choose which 
features have more value and then neglect those features with benefits that will not outweigh the 
costs.  
Within this reference design, security features will be added to the condensed cyber-
physical system to assess the benefits that each security will deliver. The analysis will begin with 
no securities in place to demonstrate preexisting vulnerabilities within the system. This approach 
will be monitored on each of the three defined layers of the reference design: communications 
layer, control layer, and hardware layer. For a more in-depth look at each layer, reference 
Chapter 2. An example will be given of what each layer, with little to no security features, 
demonstrates as a base line. From here, the approach will add security techniques to every layer 
with mitigation for each determined vulnerability. Each layer will then individually appraise the 
effectiveness of the mitigation strategies implemented to justify the costs of each method. 
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Another important piece to consider in each layer is the economy of scale. On an initial 
prototype, the one-time bill of material costs considered with the purchase of the security assets 
may seem unreasonable for one device, but on an economy of scale, the investments become 
much more incremental.  
4.2 Overhead and Computation Costs 
 The leading concern most engineers will consider during the design is monetary costs of 
a product. They will use that as a basis as to whether each examined component is worth 
implementing. There are more options to consider before deciding the overall value of a device. 
One important factor is the physical effect these implementations will have on a system. For 
example, in cyber security, an important measurement to consider is the computational impact of 
adding more complex tasks and how that effects other operations. If some task takes significant 
bandwidth and resource allocation, then adding an additional concurrent task could be 
overbearing on the system. In contrast, if there are too many tasks already limiting the reserves 
of the system, an alternative element could be included to help supplement the computational 
load on the system. To estimate computation costs, each scenario must be viewed relative to the 
environment that the components will be placed in.  
4.2.1 Appending Communication Security 
The base line for the communication layer is a web server being hosted on the Raspberry 
Pi 4. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the web server is hosting an HTTPS server for a secure channel 
to the user interface. The added security in this layer is the use of the HTTPS protocol over the 
HTTP, which provides the secure communication line as well as certificate authority. HTTP 
initialization is much faster due to the lack of SSL handshaking between the server and the 
client. This has been discussed previously in Figure 3.5. OpenSSL client/server session flow [5]. 
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In context of program cycles, the time required for both HTTP and HTTPS to initialize is 
moderately different with HTTPS taking a bit longer. However, when the system is pushing a 
large amount of dynamic web server data, for example, the time required to initialize each 
connection will seem insignificant compared to the overall loading time. Applying HTTPS to the 
web server communication would appeal to most developers who are more focused on the 
privacy and authenticity of the connection, rather than those who are focused on the speed of the 
connection.  
The TPM was added as an additional level of security in the communications layer. This 
is not necessary in order to realize the basic security features of the HTTPS protocol, but this 
enhances these security features. The TPM does this through a few different techniques, all of 
which are not implemented, to reduce complexity in the reference design. More on these features 
and their implementation can be found in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The emphasis applied in this 
reference design prototype is focused on securing the SSL Certificate key. The important 
resources to consider reside in the Raspberry Pi controller. This architecture is run on a 
Broadcom BCM2711, 64-bit Quad core Cortex-A72, running at 1.5 GHz, and equipped with 4 
GB of RAM. These components are particularly excessive considering the capabilities of this 
system far exceed the resources required to operate the web server and user interface. The 
overhead, introduced by the TPM key exchange, will not be significant to the performance of the 
Raspberry Pi. However, comparing the performance of the SSL key exchange, for this HTTPS 
web server, to another HTTPS web server that does not have TPM key management, will show 
differences in performance [2]. Having a TPM manage the Certificate will also lead to increasing 
connection times of clients attempting to access the server in a short period of time. This is 
because each client is required to wait for the previous client to finish with the TPM. Whereas, in 
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a system without a TPM, client connection times are not impacted as much since the processor 
can use multiple threads and cores to handle these tasks. This can be noted in Figure 4.1. The 
significance of the performance impact, shown in Figure 4.1. Performance Breakdown of TLS 
Accesses [2] will be decided by the developer. The decision to implement this method has 
considerable advantages that can outweigh the cost if security is the main concern. There have 
also been revisions to the TPM architecture since this publication, possibly lessening the multiple 
user connection times.  
 




Figure 4.2.Performance Breakdown by Percentage [2]. 
 
Figure 4.3.Connection Time of Successive Clients [2]. 
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4.2.2 Appending Controller Security  
 The power electronics controller being used in the reference design prototype is a Texas 
Instruments Delfino TMS320F28335 digital signal processor. This processor runs at a 150 MHz 
system clock with a plethora of general-purpose inputs and outputs. The DSP operates the power 
electronics hardware through various control algorithms. The code running the 3-phase inverter 
has a simple PI control loop, with a basic PWM inverter control scheme. This device can handle 
much more than what is being utilized, but the computation costs are relative to the use case of 
the developer. The security implementation for this design is rather trivial, compared to a 
complex control scheme, which would infer that the overhead costs would not interfere with the 
overall operating conditions.  
 The security technique, applied to the control layer, determines whether the 3-phase 
output is stable, and will command the output off, if the system detects an instability. This is 
achieved through additional code that pulls the sensory data after each Modbus packet 
transmission. The additional code can be found in the Appendix A, under DPS C code. It has 
been verified that the code will take a few clock cycles to move the data from the Modbus 
holding registers to local memory storage within the DSP. This is time that the system could be 




Figure 4.4. Control code Assembly breakdown. 
Only a few move commands are considered when running the additional protection code. 
Presume that Code Composer Studio Assembly breakdown is correct, and that the move takes 
two clock cycles to compute. The operating frequency of the DSP is 150 MHz. Referenced in 
Eq. (4-1), this process only takes about 13 ns per move. With a minimal use of this, the operation 
will take no time at all.  
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 =  (𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦)−1 =
1
150𝑀𝐻𝑧
=  6.667 𝑛𝑠    (4-1) 
 Though the code execution does take resources away from the core modules, the impact 
on this system is irrelevant when considering the speed at which the processor is operating. Even 
if the control scheme were to increase in complexity, this additional operation in the code should 
not hinder the overall performance of the system.  
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4.2.3 Appending Hardware Security 
Though the CPLD is not within the hardware layer, it does have a significant role in the 
hardware protection application. Put simply, the goal of appending hardware security to the 
prototype is to protect against shoot-through fault currents. This is further explained with the 
hardware layer assessment in Chapter 3. There are a few ways to protect against these types of 
faults; gate drivers, with physically programmable dead band, exist to do just that. The hardware 
would have to go through a major revision to place these gate drivers, without them previously in 
the layout. The decision was made to sacrifice computational costs of the CPLD resources, rather 
than economical costs of purchasing more parts. This also required much less engineering work, 
which is another valuable component to the design process.  
The CPLD operates at a much higher frequency than the DSP running the control code. 
This, combined with the fact that the CPLD is extremely underutilized for this purpose, allows 
for plenty of overhead in the design process. The CPLD could be used for managing 
communication as well as other data; however, the CPLD is simply acting as a routing fabric, 
connecting the digital signals across the architecture. The logical implementation of the hardware 
security is trivial, compared to the complexity and speed of the CPLD. Through VHDL 
programming, adding a logical inverter and a small arithmetic operation will go unnoticed in this 
environment. Unless the developer is using a dataflow approach to conserve any spare resources, 
this method would prove to be worth the computational costs because of how little they affect the 
system.  
4.3 Economical Costs 
There are always trade-offs when considering the economic value of a product and its 
components. The important point to take away from this economical cost evaluation, is that the 
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chosen product will meet user needs and budget. For this design, monetary value can only be 
assigned to tangible security features. Programming implementations are difficult to evaluate, 
when considering other overhead costs such as engineering time and management; therefore, 
these considerations will not be directly addressed in this evaluation. This is also due to the 
controller hardware being required for base operation, so negligible monetary value is required to 
add security through code updates. The focus points will consider hardware application choices 
such as the TPM and Raspberry Pi platforms.  
To a hobbyist or small engineering firm, the upfront costs associated with implementing 
additional hardware features to a product can be significant. Provided the design team is 
established, these upfront costs can be offset through economy of scale. The economy of scale is 
the idea that a purchase, made in large quantities and in advance, will result in a much lower 
individual price per product. Devices, such as the TPM and Raspberry Pi, can often benefit from 
this method. Although, large purchase orders are not an option and can even be a hinderance. 
Noted through Figure 4.5, sometimes purchasing items in bulk is not an option, depending on the 
retailer and stock options. Though, seen in upcharge some retailers will offer bulk options but 
will heavily upcharge a buyer to fulfill these orders due to low stock or other reasons. Economy 








Figure 4.6. MicroCenter order upcharge. 
Alternatively, the TPM can greatly benefit from the effects of economy of scale. Through 
a known online retailer, Digikey, the TPM used here is approximately $3.70; seen in Figure 4.7. 
Within the same device listing, a table exists to display the economy of scale and how that can 
affect the order. On this same page, there is another listing for the same device, but with a 
minimum purchase quantity of 2500. The price here is discounted at less than half of the original 
purchase cost. This example is one of many that shows if a product is ordered in advance at a 
large agreed quantity, then the price can be discounted heavily. This is a great illustration on 
when the economic costs are offset enough to allow a purchase to be viable if the investment can 




Figure 4.7. TPM Economy of scale example. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary of Conclusions  
This cyber-physical reference design is developed to assist power electronics engineers in 
selecting security components, to be included into the system, throughout the design process. 
The demand for this reference design is derived from numerous production power electronic 
devices deploying with insufficient security features. Even so, when these devices have security 
features considered, these features are normally an afterthought of the design and are not 
typically ideal solutions. This design proposes a three-layered approach to overcome this 
obstacle and teach the user how to address certain security concerns thoroughly. The three layers 
consider communications, controls, and hardware templates of a power electronics system. The 
system is evaluated for potential threats that can be identified through a threat model, which will 
show common weaknesses in each environment. Once these weaknesses are discovered, the risks 
are identified and characterized in order of criticality. Subsequently, serious risks can be focused 
on in order to mitigate most issues. Mitigation strategies are proposed, tested, and evaluated for a 
prototype design on an economical and computational cost metric. Costs of most elements are 
considered and justified for the implementation. The implementation is decided by the design 
engineer, and the reference design is the tool to help balance the trade-off choices between the 
monetary costs and value that it brings into the system. In conclusion, the reference design work 
detailed above will allow for a flexible and secure design methodology that can then add value to 




5.2 Recommendations and Future Work 
Minor recommendations can be implemented with utilizing the TPM for other tasks 
outside of certificate safety. The TPM can be taken out of the communication layer and then be 
added to the controls layer. This could benefit any communication bus architecture, such as 
Wishbone, implemented directly on the CPLD communication bus. This would provide secure 
encryption, hardware hash generation, and many more security options that are not available in 
the current topology. Other areas for improvement would be to build a phone web application to 
better interface with the device. However, security may become a risk when involving more 
platforms. This reference design can then be expanded upon in other regions to apply to specific 
needs of each designer.  
In addition to these recommendations, many other categories could be appended to the 
reference design to relate to the individual needs of the designer. This reference design is 
described as flexible because more situational attributes can be applied to the design process. For 
example, if there is a need to add higher priority communications that require more security than 
the rest; that can be added. A plethora of other options exist to work in the needs of the designer 





APPENDIX A: CODE 
A-1 DSP C Code 
/** 
*   Engineer:           Nicholas Blair 
*   Contact:            npb002@uark.edu 
*   Company:            University of Arkansas (NCREPT) 
*   Website:            https://ncrept.uark.edu/ 
* 
*   Create Date:        01Mar2020 
*   Design Name:        Buck_Boost_Inverter_PI 
*   Project Version:    v0.2.3 
*   Target Devices:     TMS320F28335 
*   Hardware:           UCB_Small_v2.1c; UCB_PE-EVAL_v1.5a 
*   Tool Versions:      Code Composer Studio v8.1.0.00011 






#defineDEBUG_EN  0  // Set to 1 for Debug Mode or 0 for Flash Mode 
#define Freq_Clk  150e6 // Clock Frequency (150 MHz) 
#defineFreq_Sw   0x03C0 // Set Switching Frequency in Fixed Point 
(30 kHz) 
//#define Freq_Fund_AC 0x0780 // Set Fundamental Output Frequency in 
Fixed Point (60 Hz) 
#defineFreq_Fund_AC 0x0140 // Set Fundamental Output Frequency in Fixed Point 
(10 Hz) 
//#define AC_Ref   0x0140 // Set Peak Output AC Magnitude Reference 
in Fixed Point (10 V) 
#define AC_Ref   0x0300 // Set Peak Output AC Magnitude Reference 
in Fixed Point (24 V) 













// ADC start parameters 
#if (CPU_FRQ_150MHZ)     // Default - 150 MHz SYSCLKOUT 
  #define ADC_MODCLK 0x3 // HSPCLK = SYSCLKOUT/2*ADC_MODCLK2 = 150/(2*3)   
= 25.0 MHz 
#endif 
#if (CPU_FRQ_100MHZ) 
  #define ADC_MODCLK 0x2 // HSPCLK = SYSCLKOUT/2*ADC_MODCLK2 = 100/(2*2)   
= 25.0 MHz 
#endif 
#define ADC_CKPS   0x1   // ADC module clock = HSPCLK/2*ADC_CKPS   = 
25.0MHz/(1*2) = 12.5MHz 
 
 
////Prototype statements for functions 
void Gpio_Init(void);  // Initialize GPIO Outputs and Inputs 
void ADC_Init(void);  // Initialize ADC 
void InitEPWM1(void);  // Initialize EPWM1 Module 
void InitEPWM2(void);  // Initialize EPWM2 Module 
void InitEPWM3(void);  // Initialize EPWM3 Module 
void InitEPWM4(void);  // Initialize EPWM4 Module 
void InitFlash();   // Initialize Flash Module 
void MemCopy();    // Flash Memory Copy function 
 
//// Prototype statements for Serial functions 
//void scia_echoback_init(void);  // Initialize Serial Module: SCIA  DLB, 8-bit word, 
baud rate 0x000F, default, 1 STOP bit, no parity 
//void scia_fifo_init(void);   // Initialize FIFO for serial communication 
//void scia_xmit(int a);    // Send a single character via the serial port 
//void scia_msg(char *msg);   // Send a string of character via the serial port 
 
////Interrupts 
interrupt void adc_isr(void);  // Interrupt routine for ADC 
 
////External Functions 
// For Ramfuncs 
extern Uint16 RamfuncsLoadStart;    // Variable for MemCopy for loading data into flash. 
extern Uint16 RamfuncsLoadEnd;      // Variable for MemCopy for loading data into flash. 
extern Uint16 RamfuncsRunStart;     // Variable for MemCopy for loading data into flash. 
//For Dclfuncs 
extern Uint16 DclfuncsLoadStart;    // Variable for MemCopy for loading data into flash. 
extern Uint16 DclfuncsLoadEnd;      // Variable for MemCopy for loading data into flash. 
extern Uint16 DclfuncsRunStart;     // Variable for MemCopy for loading data into flash. 
 
////For Debug/Flash Selection 










float32 DSP_ADC_Scale;  // Scaling factor for DSP ADC 
float32 DSP_ADC_Scale2;      // Scaling factor for DSP ADC 
float32 SPI_ADC_Scale;  // Scaling factor for SPI ADC 
float32 Current_Scale;  // Scaling factor Current Sensors 
float32 R_Div_Scale1;  // Scaling factor Voltage Divider 
float32 R_Div_Scale2;  // Scaling factor Voltage Divider 
float32 R_Div_Scale3;       // Scaling factor Voltage Divider 
 
//Uint16 V_ADC[8];   //  ADC Register Values 
 
ModbusSlave mb;             // Modbus Variables 
long Temp_mb1, Temp_mb2, Temp_GPDAT,Temp_Read1,Temp_Read2 =0;        // Declare 
Temp Variables as a Long and initialize to 0 
 
//Registers 
Uint16 Reg[160];    // Registers for command and data 
int i;                      // Counter 
float V_ADCmax = 3.0;       // Maximum ADC Voltage 
Uint16 V_ADC[16];           // ADC Register Values 




//// Constants for setting the correct parameters based on switching frequency//// 
//Prd_PWM = 2 x TBPRD × TTBCLK => TBPRD = [Freq_PWM/(2*TTBCLK)] -1 
//Example1(30kHz): PWM_TBPRD = [(30e3^-1)/(2*60e6^-1)-1] = 999 
//Example1(1kHz): PWM_TBPRD = [(1e3^-1)/(2*60e6^-1)-1] = 29999 
float FreqClk;    // Clock Freq (150 MHz) 
float FreqPWM;    // Switching Freq 
int FreqFund_AC;   // Fundamental AC Freq 
 
Uint16 PWM_TBPRD;   // PWM Period; \n Prd_PWM = 2 x TBPRD × 
TTBCLK => TBPRD = [Freq_PWM/(2*TTBCLK)] -1 \n Example1(30kHz): PWM_TBPRD = 
[(30e3^-1)/(2*60e6^-1)-1] = 999 \n 
float Prd_Sw;    // Switching cycles per fundamental period Ex:(30 kHz / 
60Hz = 500) 
float Prd_Sw_d4;   // Switching cycles per fundamental period divided by 4  





int Pkt_ID = 0;    // Packet Variable for Serial Communications 
(Packet ID) 
int Pkt_Len = 0;   // Packet Variable for Serial Communications (Packet 
Length) 
int Pkt_Reg = 0;   // Packet Variable for Serial Communications (Number of 
Registers) 
int Pkt_Addr = 0;   // Packet Variable for Serial Communications (Starting 
Address) 
int Pkt_CkSum = 0;   // Packet Variable for Serial Communications (Checksum) 
int Pkt_TX_Temp = 0;  // Packet Variable for Serial Communications (Temp Value 
of Data) 
int Pkt_Data[512] ={0};  // Buffer for Serial Packet 
 
int i; //!< Generic Counter variable 
 
////ADC Values 
//DSP ADC Values 
float V_DCin; // Converted ADC Value for VDC Input 
float V_PhA; // Converted ADC Value for Phase_A for 3-phase inverter 
float V_PhB; // Converted ADC Value for Phase_B for 3-phase inverter 
float V_PhC; // Converted ADC Value for Phase_C for 3-phase inverter 
float V_Buck; // Converted ADC Value for Buck 
float V_Boost; // Converted ADC Value for Boost 
float I_DCin; // Converted ADC Value for IDC input [Scaled to 3V] 
float V_Pot; // Converted ADC Value for Potentiometer [Scaled to 3V] 
//SPI ADC Values 
float I_DCin2; // Converted SPI ADC Value for VDC Current Input 
float I_L1;     // Converted SPI ADC Value for Phase_A for 3-phase inverter 
float I_L2;     // Converted SPI ADC Value for Phase_B for 3-phase inverter 
float I_L3;     // Converted SPI ADC Value for Phase_C for 3-phase inverter 
float I_Buck; // Converted SPI ADC Value for Buck 
float I_Boost; // Converted SPI ADC Value for Boost 
float Ia;     // Converted SPI ADC Value for Ia or I_L4 Current [Jumper JP3] 
float I_L5;     // Converted SPI ADC Value for Potentiometer 
//ADC Scaling factors 
float V_Scale1; // Scaling factor for ADC Values (V_ADC_Max/D_ADC_Max) 
float V_Scale2; // Scaling factor for ADC Values 
float V_Scale3; // Scaling factor for ADC Values for SPI (5V/4095) 
float I_Scale1; // Scaling factor for Current Values (185mV/A)^-1 
float I_Scale2; // Scaling factor for Current Values (185mV/A)^-1 
float V_Scaled[16] = {0};            // Scaled ADC Values for Modbus 
//ADC Validation Flags 
char ADC_valid1 = 0; //Flag for determining if ADC voltage is in correct range 
char ADC_valid2 = 0; //Flag for determining if ADC voltage is in correct range 




//3-Phase Inverter Variables 
float AC_Mag;  // AC Magnitude reference (V) 
float AC_Freq_Fund; // AC Fundamental Frequency Ref (Hz) 
float pi;   // Value of PI (3.1415926535898) 
float pi_2;   // Value of 2 x PI 
float phase_offset; // Phase offset for 3-phase output voltages 120 degree offset (2/3)*pi 
float Step_sin;  // Used in calculating the sin output for 3-phase inverter; Step_sin = 
(Sin_Counter/Prd_Sw)*pi_2; 
float Sine1;  // Duty to generate Duty Cycle for 3-Phase PWM 
float Sine2;  // Duty to generate Duty Cycle for 3-Phase PWM 
float Sine3;  // Duty to generate Duty Cycle for 3-Phase PWM 
float Duty_AC;  // Duty Cycle for 3-Phase PWM; Based on AC Magnitude 
reference and PWM Frequency. 
Uint16 Sin_Counter; // Used to calculate the value of sin output; Based on number of interrupts 
Uint16 DeadTime; // Deadtime; 30 clk cycles = (150e6^-1)*30 => 200ns 
 
//SPI Variables 
Uint16 spi_cmd;  // Used to store ADC Command to read all Channels Continuously; 
"0xFFDF" 
Uint16 rdata[8]; // Array for saving SPI ADC Data 
Uint16 spi_temp; // Temp received data from SPI 
///PI Variables 
PI pi1 = PI_DEFAULTS; // PI Buck Control Variables 
PI pi2 = PI_DEFAULTS; // PI Boost Control Variables 
float uk1;    // PI Buck Control Output Variable 








 spi_cmd = 0xFFDF;  //Set SPI command for ADC continuous read 
 
 pi1.Umin = 0; 
 pi2.Umin =0; 
 
// //Initialize Variables for Serial Communication 
//    Uint16 ReceivedChar; 
//    //char *msg; 
//    Pkt_ID =0; 
//    Pkt_Len=0; 
//    Pkt_Reg=0; 
//    Pkt_Addr=0; 
67 
 
//    Pkt_CkSum = 0; 
 
    //Initialize Arrays to zero 
    for(i=0;i<512;i++) 
    { 
     Pkt_Data[i] =0; 
    } 
 
    for(i=0;i<128;i++) 
    { 
     Reg[i] =0; 
    } 
 
    for(i=0; i<8;i++) 
    { 
     rdata[i] = 0; 
    } 
 
 
    //Setup the initial Switching frequency 
    //Prd_PWM = 2 x TBPRD × TTBCLK => TBPRD = [Freq_PWM/(2*TTBCLK)] -1 
    //Example1(30kHz): PWM_TBPRD = [(30e3^-1)/(2*60e6^-1)-1] = 999 
    //Example1(1kHz): PWM_TBPRD = [(1e3^-1)/(2*60e6^-1)-1] = 29999 
    FreqClk = Freq_Clk;    //Clock Freq (150 MHz) 
    /* 
    -- Reg[0] => Switching Freq [0-1000kHz (in kHz)] 
    -- Reg[1] => Buck Reference [Vref Range= (0-2^12) (0-50V)] 
    -- Reg[2] => Boost Reference [Vref Range= (0-2^12) (0-50V)] 
    -- Reg[3] => AC Magnitude Reference [Vref Range= (0-2^12) (0-50V)] 
    -- Reg[4] => AC Fundamental Freq Reference [0-1000Hz] 
    -- Reg[5] => Kp Buck Parameter [0-100 in 0.01 increments] 
 -- Reg[6] => Ki Buck Parameter [0-100 in 0.01 increments] 
  -- Reg[7] => Kp Boost Parameter [0-100 in 0.01 increments] 
 -- Reg[8] => Ki Boost Parameter [0-100 in 0.01 increments] 
    */ 
 Reg[0] = Freq_Sw;  //Set Switching Frequency (in  kHz) 
    Reg[1] = 0;    //Set Buck Voltage Reference 
    Reg[2] = 0;    //Set Boost Voltage Reference 
    Reg[3] = AC_Ref;  //Set AC Mag Reference 
    Reg[4] = Freq_Fund_AC; //Set AC Fund Reference 
    DeadTime = 30;        //Deadtime; 30 clk 
cycles = (150e6^-1)*30 => 200ns 
 
 //V_Scale_DSP = (V_DSP_ADC_Max/D_DSP_ADC_Max);  //Scaling factor for 
DSP ADC 
 //V_Scale_SPI = (V_SPI_ADC_Max/D_SPI_ADC_Max);  //Scaling factor for DSP ADC 
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 //V_Scale2 = V_Scale1*32.65;   //Scaling factor for ADC 
 //V_Scale3 = (5.0/4095);    //Scaling factor for SPI ADC 




 DSP_ADC_Scale = (3.0/4095);      // Scaling factor for DSP ADC 
 //DSP_ADC_Scale2 = ((3.0/4095)-0.9); 
 SPI_ADC_Scale = (5.0/4095);      // Scaling factor for SPI ADC 
 Current_Scale = (5.4054);      // Scaling factor for Current Sensor (185mV/A)^-
1 
 R_Div_Scale1 = (32.6456);      // (31.6e3/(1e6+31.6e3))^-1 
 R_Div_Scale2 = (1.6667);      // (15e3/(10e3+15e3))^-1 
 R_Div_Scale3 = (1.1460);            // (13.7e3/(1e6+13.7e3))^-1 
 
 
 V_Scale1 = DSP_ADC_Scale * R_Div_Scale1;    
 //Voltage scaling factor for Vin,Va,Vb,Vc,V_Buck,V_Boost 
 V_Scale2 = SPI_ADC_Scale* R_Div_Scale1; 
 V_Scale3 = DSP_ADC_Scale2 * R_Div_Scale3; 
 I_Scale1 = DSP_ADC_Scale*Current_Scale*R_Div_Scale2;  //Current 
scaling factor for Iin (DSP ADC) 
 I_Scale2 = SPI_ADC_Scale*Current_Scale;     
 //Current scaling factor for Iin,Ia,Ib,Ic,I_Buck,I_Boost 
 
 ////Update Values (IQ5) 
    FreqPWM = (((Reg[0] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[0] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP))*1e3;  
   //Switching Freq in Hz 
    Buck_Cmd = (((Reg[1] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[1] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP)); 
    Boost_Cmd = (((Reg[2] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[2] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP)); 
    AC_Mag =  (((Reg[3] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[3] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP));   
   //AC Magnitude 
    FreqFund_AC = (((Reg[4] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[4] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP));  
   //Set AC Fundamental Freq 
    PWM_TBPRD = (1/FreqPWM)/(2*(1/FreqClk))-1;      
      //Set initial PWM Period 
    Prd_Sw = FreqPWM/FreqFund_AC;        
       //Switching cycles per fundamental period 
Ex:(30 kHz / 60Hz = 500) 
    Prd_Sw_d4 = Prd_Sw/4;          










 Buck_Cmd = 0.0; 
 Boost_Cmd = 0.0; 
 
 
 // Step 1. Initialize System Control: 
 // PLL, WatchDog, enable Peripheral Clocks 
    InitSysCtrl(); 
 
 EALLOW; 
    SysCtrlRegs.HISPCP.all = ADC_MODCLK; // HSPCLK = 
SYSCLKOUT/ADC_MODCLK 
    EDIS; 
 
    // Step 2. Initialize GPIO: 
    // InitGpio(); 
 
    // For this example, only init the pins for the SCI-A port. 
    // This function is found in the DSP2833x_Sci.c file. 
    //InitSciaGpio(); 
 
    // Step 3. Clear all interrupts and initialize PIE vector table: 
    // Disable CPU interrupts 
    DINT; 
 
    // Initialize the PIE control registers to their default state. 
    // The default state is all PIE interrupts disabled and flags 
    // are cleared. 
    // This function is found in the DSP2803x_PieCtrl.c file. 
    InitPieCtrl(); 
 
    // Disable CPU interrupts and clear all CPU interrupt flags: 
    IER = 0x0000; 
    IFR = 0x0000; 
 
    // Initialize the PIE vector table with pointers to the shell Interrupt 
    // Service Routines (ISR). 
    // This will populate the entire table, even if the interrupt 
    // is not used in this example.  This is useful for debug purposes. 
    InitPieVectTable(); 
 
 // Interrupts that are used in this example are re-mapped to 
 // ISR functions found within this file. 
    EALLOW;  // This is needed to write to EALLOW protected registers 
    //PieVectTable.EPWM1_INT = &epwm1_isr; 
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    //PieVectTable.EPWM2_INT = &epwm2_isr; 
    //PieVectTable.EPWM3_INT = &epwm3_isr; 
    PieVectTable.ADCINT = &adc_isr; 
    EDIS;    // This is needed to disable write to EALLOW protected registers 
 
    EALLOW; 
   Gpio_Init(); //Initialize GPIO 
   InitSciaGpio(); 
   EDIS; 
 
 
    // Debug or flash mode selection 
    #if DEBUG_EN    > 0 
        // do nothing, as default debug mode 
    #else 
        MemCopy(&RamfuncsLoadStart, &RamfuncsLoadEnd, &RamfuncsRunStart); 
        MemCopy(&DclfuncsLoadStart, &DclfuncsLoadEnd, &DclfuncsRunStart); 
        InitFlash(); 
    #endif 
 
 ADC_Init(); // Initialize ADC 
 
    InitEPwm1Gpio(); 
    InitEPwm2Gpio(); 
    InitEPwm3Gpio(); 
    InitEPwm4Gpio(); 
 
// // Step 5. User specific code, enable interrupts: 
//    scia_fifo_init();    // Initialize the SCI FIFO 
//    scia_echoback_init();  // Initialize SCI for echoback 
 
    //LSPCLK = 50MHZ 
         //SpiaRegs.SPIBRR.bit.SPI_BIT_RATE = 0x0031; //set the SPI baud rate 
         //SpiaRegs.SPIBRR.all = 0x007F; 
         //SpiaRegs.SPIBRR.all = 0x007F; 
         //7Fh (R/W) = SPI Baud Rate = LSPCLK/128 
         //13h (R/W) = SPI Baud Rate = LSPCLK/20 
 
    ////SPI Configuration 
 EALLOW; 
 
 SpiaRegs.SPICCR.bit.SPISWRESET = 0;  // SPI software reset 
 
 //SpiaRegs.SPIBRR = 0x007F;    // SPI Clock scaler 
 SpiaRegs.SPIBRR = 0x0004;    //SPI Clock scaler 
 SpiaRegs.SPICCR.bit.SPICHAR = 0xF;   //SPI character length 16 bit 
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 SpiaRegs.SPICTL.bit.MASTER_SLAVE = 1;  //SPI (Master) 
 SpiaRegs.SPICTL.bit.TALK = 1;    //SPI Enable Comm 
 SpiaRegs.SPICCR.bit.SPILBK = 0;   //Disable loopback 
 SpiaRegs.SPIFFTX.bit.SPIFFENA    = 1; //Enable SPI FIFO 
 SpiaRegs.SPIFFTX.bit.SPIRST     = 1; //SPI FIFO can TX (or) RX 
 SpiaRegs.SPIFFTX.bit.TXFIFO      = 1; //Release TX FIFO from reset 
 SpiaRegs.SPIFFTX.bit.TXFFIENA    = 0;  //disable TX FIFO interrupt 
 SpiaRegs.SPIFFRX.bit.RXFIFORESET = 0; //Reset FIFO pointer to 0 
 SpiaRegs.SPIFFRX.bit.RXFFIENA  = 0; //disable RX FIFO interrupt 
 //SpiaRegs.SPIFFRX.bit.RXFFIL  = 0x08;//Generate RX FIFO interrupt after 
receiving 8 words 
 SpiaRegs.SPIFFRX.bit.RXFIFORESET = 1; //Enable RX FIFO operation 
 







 SpiaRegs.SPICCR.bit.SPISWRESET = 1;  //Release SPI software reset 
 EDIS; 
 
    ////End SPI Configuration 
 
 //Setup SPI ADC for Continuous Read 
 SpiaRegs.SPITXBUF = 0xFFFF; //Send Dummy Data to SPI 
 while(SpiaRegs.SPIFFRX.bit.RXFFST !=1); //wait for response 
 rdata[0] = SpiaRegs.SPIRXBUF; 
 SpiaRegs.SPITXBUF = 0xFFFF; //Send Dummy Data to SPI 
 while(SpiaRegs.SPIFFRX.bit.RXFFST !=1); //wait for response 
 rdata[1] = SpiaRegs.SPIRXBUF; 
 SpiaRegs.SPITXBUF = spi_cmd; //Send read all cmd to SPI 
 while(SpiaRegs.SPIFFRX.bit.RXFFST !=1); //wait for response 
 rdata[2] = SpiaRegs.SPIRXBUF; 
 
    mb = construct_ModbusSlave(); 
 
 //Main Loop 
 for(;;) 
    { 
 
        mb.loopStates(&mb); 
 
        //Copy Values from Modbus registers to global registers 
        for(i=128;i<160;i++) 
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        { 
            Reg[i] = mb.holdingRegisters.Mod_Reg[i]; 
        } 
 
        /* 
        *   Reg[128] => GPADAT-1_Cmd (GPIO00 - GPIO15) 
        *   Reg[129] => GPADAT-2_Cmd (GPIO16 - GPIO31) 
        *   Reg[130] => GPBDAT-1_Cmd (GPIO32 - GPIO47) 
        *   Reg[131] => GPBDAT-2_Cmd (GPIO48 - GPIO63) 
        *   Reg[132] => GPADAT-1_Read (GPIO00 - GPIO15) 
        *   Reg[133] => GPADAT-2_Read (GPIO16 - GPIO31) 
        *   Reg[134] => GPBDAT-1_Read (GPIO32 - GPIO47) 
        *   Reg[135] => GPBDAT-2_Read (GPIO48 - GPIO63) 
        *   Reg[136] => ADC-A0 (IDC_A Connector) 
        *   Reg[137] => ADC-A1 (IDC_A Connector) 
        *   Reg[138] => ADC-A2 (IDC_A Connector) 
        *   Reg[139] => ADC-A3 (IDC_A Connector) 
        *   Reg[140] => ADC-A4 (IDC_A Connector) 
        *   Reg[141] => ADC-A5 (IDC_A Connector) 
        *   Reg[142] => ADC-A6 (IDC_A Connector) 
        *   Reg[143] => ADC-A7 (IDC_A Connector) 
        *   Reg[144] => ADC-B0 (IDC_B Connector) 
        *   Reg[145] => ADC-B1 (IDC_B Connector) 
        *   Reg[146] => ADC-B2 (IDC_B Connector) 
        *   Reg[147] => ADC-B3 (IDC_B Connector) 
        *   Reg[148] => ADC-B4 (IDC_B Connector) 
        *   Reg[149] => ADC-B5 (IDC_B Connector) 
        *   Reg[150] => ADC-B6 (IDC_B Connector) 
        *   Reg[151] => ADC-B7 (IDC_B Connector) 
        */ 
 
        // Read or Write mode selection 
        #if R_W_FLAG    > 0 
            //Write Mode 
            ////Read from Modbus and write to outputs. 
            //GPADAT => GPIO00 - GPIO31 
            Temp_mb1 = Reg[2]; 
            GpioDataRegs.GPADAT.all =  (Reg[1] & 0x0000FFFF) | ((Temp_mb1 << 16) & 
0xFFFF0000); //Merge upper and lower registers and write to the GPADAT Register. 
            //GPBDAT => GPIO32 - GPIO63 
            Temp_mb2 = Reg[4]; 
            GpioDataRegs.GPBDAT.all =  (Reg[3] & 0x0000FFFF) | ((Temp_mb2 << 16) & 
0xFFFF0000); //Merge upper and lower registers and write to the GPBDAT Register. 
 
        #else 
            //Read Mode 
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        #endif 
 
        ////Read from GPIO and write to Modbus Registers 
        //GPADAT => GPIO00 - GPIO31 
        Reg[132] = (GpioDataRegs.GPADAT.all & 0xFFFF); 
        Reg[133] = (GpioDataRegs.GPADAT.all >> 16); 
        mb.holdingRegisters.Mod_Reg[0] = Reg[132];  // Mod_Reg[5] -> Mod_Reg[0] 
        mb.holdingRegisters.Mod_Reg[1] = Reg[133];  // Mod_Reg[6] -> Mod_Reg[1] 
 
        //GPBDAT => GPIO32 - GPIO63 
        Reg[134] = (GpioDataRegs.GPBDAT.all & 0xFFFF); 
        Reg[135] = (GpioDataRegs.GPBDAT.all >> 16); 
        mb.holdingRegisters.Mod_Reg[2] = Reg[134];  // Mod_Reg[7] -> Mod_Reg[2] 
        mb.holdingRegisters.Mod_Reg[3] = Reg[135];  // Mod_Reg[8] -> Mod_Reg[3] 
 
        //Reg[136] = 500; 
        //mb.holdingRegisters.Mod_Reg[1] = Reg[136]; 
 
        //Set ADC Trigger (Cleared in ISR) 
        AdcRegs.ADCTRL2.bit.SOC_SEQ1 = 1; 
 
 
        for(i=0;i<16;i++) 
        { 
            // Reconstructed ADC values to real world values 
            //V_ADC[i] = V_ADC_Temp[i] * (V_ADCmax/4095);     // V_ADC*(3.0/4095) 
            // Write Data to Holding Registers 
            mb.holdingRegisters.Mod_Reg[i+4] = V_Scaled[i];                 // Mod_Reg[i+9] -> 
Mod_Reg[i+4] 
            // Store Holding Registers to Local Registers for Debugging 
            Reg[i+136] = mb.holdingRegisters.Mod_Reg[i+4];                  // Mod_Reg[i+9] -> 
Mod_Reg[i+4] 
 
        } 
 
 
        if (Reg[33] >= 1600) 
        { 
            ADC_valid3 = ADC_valid2; 
            ADC_valid2 = ADC_valid1; 
            ADC_valid1 = 1; 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            ADC_valid1 = 0; 
            ADC_valid2 = 0; 
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            //ADC_valid3 = 0; 
        } 
 
 
        if (ADC_valid3) 
            Reg[3] = 0; 
        else 
        { 
            for(i=0;i<9;i++) 
            { 
                // Store Holding Registers to Local Registers for Modbus Write Commands 
                Reg[i] = mb.holdingRegisters.Mod_Reg[i+20];                     // Mod_Reg[i+32] -> 
Mod_Reg[i+20] 
            } 
        } 
 
        //Temp_Read1 = GpioDataRegs.GPADAT.all; 
        //Temp_Read2 = GpioDataRegs.GPBDAT.all; 
 
 
  ////SPI Communication 
  SpiaRegs.SPITXBUF = 0x0000; //Send dummy cmd to SPI 
  while(SpiaRegs.SPIFFRX.bit.RXFFST <1); //wait for response 
  //rdata[spi_cnt] = SpiaRegs.SPIRXBUF; 
  spi_temp = SpiaRegs.SPIRXBUF; 
 
  if((spi_temp & 0xF000) == 0x0000)   //Check if Address is 0; if 
true then write lower 12-bits to rdata 
   rdata[0] = (spi_temp & 0x0FFF); 
  else if((spi_temp & 0xF000) == 0x1000)  //Check if Address is 1; if 
true then write lower 12-bits to rdata 
   rdata[1] = (spi_temp & 0x0FFF); 
  else if((spi_temp & 0xF000) == 0x2000)  //Check if Address is 2; if 
true then write lower 12-bits to rdata 
   rdata[2] = (spi_temp & 0x0FFF); 
  else if((spi_temp & 0xF000) == 0x3000)  //Check if Address is 3; if 
true then write lower 12-bits to rdata 
   rdata[3] = (spi_temp & 0x0FFF); 
  else if((spi_temp & 0xF000) == 0x4000)  //Check if Address is 4; if 
true then write lower 12-bits to rdata 
   rdata[4] = (spi_temp & 0x0FFF); 
  else if((spi_temp & 0xF000) == 0x5000)  //Check if Address is 5; if 
true then write lower 12-bits to rdata 
   rdata[5] = (spi_temp & 0x0FFF); 
  else if((spi_temp & 0xF000) == 0x6000)  //Check if Address is 6; if 
true then write lower 12-bits to rdata 
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   rdata[6] = (spi_temp & 0x0FFF); 
  else if((spi_temp & 0xF000) == 0x7000)  //Check if Address is 7; if 
true then write lower 12-bits to rdata 
   rdata[7] = (spi_temp & 0x0FFF); 
 
 
//     ////Serial Communication 
//  if(SciaRegs.SCIFFRX.bit.RXFFST) //check to see if data is ready (Polling) 
//  { 
//   ReceivedChar = SciaRegs.SCIRXBUF.all; //Get Character 
//   if(ReceivedChar== 0x7E) //Check if start delimiter 
//   { 
//    Pkt_CkSum = 0xFF; //Set Temp Check Sum to 0xFF 
//    while(SciaRegs.SCIFFRX.bit.RXFFST !=1) { } // wait for XRDY 
=1 for empty state (Blocking) 
//    ReceivedChar = SciaRegs.SCIRXBUF.all; //Get Character 
//    //Pkt_CkSum = Pkt_CkSum - ReceivedChar; // Subtract Received 
data from Check Sum 
//    Pkt_Len = ReceivedChar; //Set packet Length 
//    for (i=0; i<Pkt_Len; i++) 
//    { 
//     while(SciaRegs.SCIFFRX.bit.RXFFST !=1) { } // wait for 
XRDY =1 for empty state (Blocking) 
//     ReceivedChar = SciaRegs.SCIRXBUF.all; //Get 
Character 
//     Pkt_CkSum = Pkt_CkSum - ReceivedChar; // Subtract 
Received data from Check Sum 
//     Pkt_Data[i]=ReceivedChar; //Copy received data to 
Pkt_Data 
//    } 
//    //Read Check Sum Value 
//    while(SciaRegs.SCIFFRX.bit.RXFFST !=1) { } // wait for XRDY 
=1 for empty state (Blocking) 
//    ReceivedChar = SciaRegs.SCIRXBUF.all; //Get Character 
//    Pkt_CkSum = Pkt_CkSum & 0x00FF; 
//    if(Pkt_CkSum == ReceivedChar)  //Checksums match! 
//    { 
//     Pkt_ID = Pkt_Data[0]; //Operation ID 
//     Pkt_Reg = Pkt_Data[1]; //Number of Registers 
//     Pkt_Addr = (Pkt_Data[2]*256)+Pkt_Data[3]; //Starting 
Address 
//     if(Pkt_ID == 0x0A) //Set Registers 
//     { 
//      for(i=0;i<Pkt_Reg;i++) 
//      { 
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//      
 Reg[Pkt_Addr+i]=(Pkt_Data[4+i*2]*256)+Pkt_Data[5+i*2]; 
//      } 
//     } 
//     else if(Pkt_ID == 0x0F) 
//     { 
//      Pkt_TX_Temp =  0; //Used to prevent data from 
updating during ChkSum Calculations 
//      Pkt_CkSum = 0xFF; //Reset Checksum 
//      scia_xmit(0x7E); //Send Start Delimiter 
//      scia_xmit(Pkt_Reg*2 + 4); //Send Packet Length 
((Register Count times 2) +4) 
//      scia_xmit(0x0A); //Send OP ID 
//      Pkt_CkSum = Pkt_CkSum - 0x0A; //Update 
Checksum 
//      scia_xmit(Pkt_Reg); //Send Number of registers 
//      Pkt_CkSum = Pkt_CkSum - Pkt_Reg; //Update 
Checksum 
//      //scia_xmit(Pkt_Addr); //Send Starting Address 
//                        scia_xmit(Pkt_Addr>>8 & 0xFF); ////Send Starting Address (Upper Byte) 
//                        Pkt_CkSum = Pkt_CkSum - (Pkt_Addr>>8 & 0xFF); //Update Checksum 
//                        scia_xmit(Pkt_Addr & 0xFF); ////Send Starting Address (Lower Byte) 
//                        Pkt_CkSum = Pkt_CkSum - (Pkt_Addr & 0xFF); //Update Checksum 
//      for(i=0;i<Pkt_Reg;i++) 
//      { 
//       Pkt_TX_Temp =  Reg[Pkt_Addr+i]; //Used 
to prevent data from updating during ChkSum Calculations 
//       scia_xmit(Pkt_TX_Temp>>8 & 0xFF); 
//Send upper byte 
//       Pkt_CkSum = Pkt_CkSum - 
(Pkt_TX_Temp>>8 & 0xFF); 
//       scia_xmit(Pkt_TX_Temp & 0xFF); //Send 
lower byte 
//       Pkt_CkSum = Pkt_CkSum - (Pkt_TX_Temp 
& 0xFF); 
//      } 
//      scia_xmit(Pkt_CkSum & 0xFF); 
//     } 
//    } 
//   } 
//  } 
//  ////End Serial Communication 
 
  ////Update Values (IQ5) 
     FreqPWM = (((Reg[0] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[0] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP))*1e3; 
    //Switching Freq in Hz 
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     Buck_Cmd = (((Reg[1] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[1] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP)); 
     Boost_Cmd = (((Reg[2] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[2] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP)); 
     AC_Mag =  (((Reg[3] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[3] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP));  
    //AC Magnitude 
     FreqFund_AC = (((Reg[4] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[4] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP)); 
    //Set AC Fundamental Freq 
     PWM_TBPRD = (1/FreqPWM)/(2*(1/FreqClk))-1;     
       //Set initial PWM Period 
     Prd_Sw = FreqPWM/FreqFund_AC;       
        //Switching cycles per fundamental 
period Ex:(30 kHz / 60Hz = 500) 
     Prd_Sw_d4 = Prd_Sw/4;         
        //Switching cycles per 1/4 
fundamental period 
     //Buck PI 
     pi1.Kp = (((Reg[5] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[5] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP));  
    //Set Kp for PI 
     pi1.Ki = (((Reg[6] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[6] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP));  
    //Set Ki for PI 
     pi1.Umax = PWM_TBPRD;        
         //Set Max Duty Cycle 
     //Boost PI 
     pi2.Kp = (((Reg[7] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[7] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP));  
    //Set Kp for PI 
     pi2.Ki = (((Reg[8] >> 5) & 0x07FF) + ((Reg[8] & 0x001F)*IQ_STEP));  
    //Set Ki for PI 
     pi2.Umax = PWM_TBPRD;        
         //Set Max Duty Cycle 
 
     //Update PWM Freq 
     EPwm1Regs.TBPRD = PWM_TBPRD; 
     EPwm2Regs.TBPRD = PWM_TBPRD; 
     EPwm3Regs.TBPRD = PWM_TBPRD; 
     EPwm4Regs.TBPRD = PWM_TBPRD; 
  //End Update Values 





 // Configure ADC 
 EALLOW; 







 IER |= M_INT1;       // Enable CPU Interrupt 1 
 //PieCtrlRegs.PIEIER1.bit.INTx1 = 1; // Enable INT 1.1 in the PIE 
    PieCtrlRegs.PIEIER1.bit.INTx6 = 1; 
 EINT;                // Enable Global interrupt INTM 




 // Specific ADC setup for this example: 
  //Sample and Hold window 
     AdcRegs.ADCTRL1.bit.ACQ_PS = 0x1;  //Window length(1+#of 
Cycles) 
     //ADC Clock Rate 
     AdcRegs.ADCTRL3.bit.ADCCLKPS = ADC_CKPS; //0 works faster but may 
result in errors // 12.5 MHz 80ns 
     AdcRegs.ADCTRL1.bit.SEQ_CASC = 1;        // 1  Cascaded mode 
     AdcRegs.ADCTRL1.bit.SEQ_OVRD = 0; 
     //Specify # of Conversions 
     AdcRegs.ADCMAXCONV.bit.MAX_CONV1 = 0x8; // convert only used 
channels 
 
     //AdcRegs.ADCTRL3.bit.SMODE_SEL = 0; //setup ADC for sequential 
sampling 
 
     //Convert used channels 
     AdcRegs.ADCCHSELSEQ1.bit.CONV00 = 0x0; //ADCA0 
     AdcRegs.ADCCHSELSEQ1.bit.CONV01 = 0x1; //ADCA1 
     AdcRegs.ADCCHSELSEQ1.bit.CONV02 = 0x2; //ADCA2 
     AdcRegs.ADCCHSELSEQ1.bit.CONV03 = 0x3; //ADCA3 
     AdcRegs.ADCCHSELSEQ2.bit.CONV04 = 0x4; //ADCA4 
     AdcRegs.ADCCHSELSEQ2.bit.CONV05 = 0x5; //ADCA5 
     AdcRegs.ADCCHSELSEQ2.bit.CONV06 = 0x6; //ADCA6 
     AdcRegs.ADCCHSELSEQ2.bit.CONV07 = 0x7; //ADCA7 
 
     AdcRegs.ADCTRL1.bit.CONT_RUN = 0;       // Setup start/stop run 
     AdcRegs.ADCTRL2.bit.EPWM_SOCA_SEQ1 = 1;// Enable SOCA from ePWM 
to start SEQ1 
     AdcRegs.ADCTRL2.bit.INT_ENA_SEQ1 = 1;  // Enable SEQ1 interrupt (every 
End Of Sequence) 
     AdcRegs.ADCTRL2.bit.INT_MOD_SEQ1 = 0;  // 
 EDIS; 
 
 //ADC Triggering Setup 
    EPwm1Regs.ETSEL.bit.SOCAEN = 1; 
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    EPwm1Regs.ETSEL.bit.SOCASEL = 0x2;//4; // 2=Select SOC from CPMA on Period; 
4=Select SOC from from CPMA on upcount 





 // Step 2. Initalize GPIO: 
 // Initialize GPIO 
    EALLOW; 
 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAMUX1.all = 0x0000;     // GPIO functionality GPIO0-GPIO15 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAMUX2.all = 0x0000;     // GPIO functionality GPIO16-GPIO31 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPBMUX1.all = 0x0000;     // GPIO functionality GPIO32-GPIO47 
 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.all = 0xFFFFFFFF;  // GPIO0-GPIO31 are outputs 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPBDIR.all = 0xFFFFFFFF;  // GPIO32-GPIO63 are outputs 
 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAQSEL1.all = 0x0000;    // GPIO0-GPIO15 Synch to SYSCLKOUT 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAQSEL2.all = 0x0000;    // GPIO16-GPIO31 Synch to SYSCLKOUT 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPBQSEL1.all = 0x0000;    // GPIO32-GPIO47 Synch to SYSCLKOUT 
 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.all = 0xFFFFFFFF;  // Pullup's disabled GPIO0-GPIO31 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPBPUD.all = 0xFFFFFFFF;  // Pullup's disabled GPIO32-GPIO63 
 
 //Serial RX/TX Config 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO28 = 0; // Configure as input 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO29 = 1; // Configure as output 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO28 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO29 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 
 
 //Switch Setup 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO14 = 0; // Configure as input (SW1) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO15 = 0; // Configure as input (SW2) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO14 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up (SW1) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO15 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up (SW2) 
 
 
 ////Configure LEDs 
 //Control Card LEDs 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO31 = 1; // Configure as output (Red_Led1 On Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO31 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO31 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPBDIR.bit.GPIO34 = 1; // Configure as output (Red_Led2 On Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPBPUD.bit.GPIO34 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
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 GpioDataRegs.GPBCLEAR.bit.GPIO34 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 
 //Demo Board LEDs 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO8 = 1; // Configure as output (LED9 On Demo 
Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO8 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO8 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO9 = 1; // Configure as output (LED10 On Demo 
Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO9 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO9 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO10 = 1; // Configure as output (LED1 On Demo 
Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO10 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO10 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO11 = 1; // Configure as output (LED2 On Demo 
Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO11 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO11 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO12 = 1; // Configure as output (LED3 On Demo 
Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO12 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO12 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO13 = 1; // Configure as output (LED4 On Demo 
Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO13 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO13 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO24 = 1; // Configure as output (LED5 On Demo 
Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO24 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO24 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO25 = 1; // Configure as output (LED6 On Demo 
Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO25 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO25 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO26 = 1; // Configure as output (LED7 On Demo 
Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO26 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO26 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO27 = 1; // Configure as output (LED8 On Demo 
Board) 
 GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO27 = 1; // Disable internal pull-up 
 GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO27 = 1; //initialize to zero 
 
 
 //Configure SPI 
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    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO16 = 0;   // Enable pull-up on GPIO16 (SPISIMOA) 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO17 = 0;   // Enable pull-up on GPIO17 (SPISOMIA) 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO18 = 0;   // Enable pull-up on GPIO18 (SPICLKA) 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAPUD.bit.GPIO19 = 0;   // Enable pull-up on GPIO19 (SPISTEA) 
 
    //GpioCtrlRegs.GPAQSEL2.bit.GPIO16 = 3; // Asynch input GPIO16 (SPISIMOA) 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAQSEL2.bit.GPIO17 = 3; // Asynch input GPIO17 (SPISOMIA) 
    //GpioCtrlRegs.GPAQSEL2.bit.GPIO18 = 3; // Asynch input GPIO18 (SPICLKA) 
    //GpioCtrlRegs.GPAQSEL2.bit.GPIO19 = 3; // Asynch input GPIO19 (SPISTEA) 
 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAMUX2.bit.GPIO16 = 1; // Configure GPIO16 as SPISIMOA 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAMUX2.bit.GPIO17 = 1; // Configure GPIO17 as SPISOMIA 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAMUX2.bit.GPIO18 = 1; // Configure GPIO18 as SPICLKA 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPAMUX2.bit.GPIO19 = 1; // Configure GPIO19 as SPISTEA 
 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO19 = 1; // Configure as output 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO16 = 1; // Configure as output 
    GpioCtrlRegs.GPADIR.bit.GPIO18 = 1; // Configure as output 




    EDIS; 
 
    InitEPwm1Gpio(); 
    InitEPwm2Gpio(); 
    InitEPwm3Gpio(); 
    InitEPwm4Gpio(); 
 
    EALLOW; 
    SysCtrlRegs.PCLKCR0.bit.TBCLKSYNC = 0; 
    EDIS; 
 
    InitEPWM1(); 
    InitEPWM2(); 
    InitEPWM3(); 
    InitEPWM4(); 
 
    EALLOW; 
    SysCtrlRegs.PCLKCR0.bit.TBCLKSYNC = 1; 
    EDIS; 
} 
 






    // Sample ADCs and converter variables to real world values 
 V_ADC[0] = AdcRegs.ADCRESULT0 >>4; 
 V_ADC[1] = AdcRegs.ADCRESULT1 >>4; 
 V_ADC[2] = AdcRegs.ADCRESULT2 >>4; 
 V_ADC[3] = AdcRegs.ADCRESULT3 >>4; 
 V_ADC[4] = AdcRegs.ADCRESULT4 >>4; 
 V_ADC[5] = AdcRegs.ADCRESULT5 >>4; 
 V_ADC[6] = AdcRegs.ADCRESULT6 >>4; 
 V_ADC[7] = AdcRegs.ADCRESULT7 >>4; 
 









 //Store ADC Values in Register Bank (AD7928) 
 Reg[40]=rdata[0] & 0x0FFF; //Remove address data 
 Reg[41]=rdata[1] & 0x0FFF; //Remove address data 
 Reg[42]=rdata[2] & 0x0FFF; //Remove address data 
 Reg[43]=rdata[3] & 0x0FFF; //Remove address data 
 Reg[44]=rdata[4] & 0x0FFF; //Remove address data 
 Reg[45]=rdata[5] & 0x0FFF; //Remove address data 
 Reg[46]=rdata[6] & 0x0FFF; //Remove address data 
 Reg[47]=rdata[7] & 0x0FFF; //Remove address data 
 
 /* 
 * Reg[32] => ADC-A_0 (DC Input Voltage) \n 
 * Reg[33] => ADC-A_1 (Phase A Voltage) \n 
 * Reg[34] => ADC-A_2 (Phase B Voltage) \n 
 * Reg[35] => ADC-A_3 (Phase C Voltage) \n 
 * Reg[36] => ADC-A_4 (Buck Voltage) \n 
 * Reg[37] => ADC-A_5 (Boost Voltage) \n 
 * Reg[38] => ADC-A_6 (DC Input Current [3V-Scaled]) \n 
 * Reg[39] => ADC-A_7 (Pot Voltage [3V-Scaled]) \n 
 * Reg[40] => ADC-SPI_0 (DC Input Current) \n 
 * Reg[41] => ADC-SPI_1 (L1 Current) [Phase A] \n 
 * Reg[42] => ADC-SPI_2 (L2 Current) [Phase B] \n 
 * Reg[43] => ADC-SPI_3 (L3 Current) [Phase C] \n 
 * Reg[44] => ADC-SPI_4 (Buck Current) \n 
 * Reg[45] => ADC-SPI_5 (Boost Current) \n 
 * Reg[46] => ADC-SPI_6 (Ia or I_L4 Current) [Jumper JP3] \n 
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 // Reconstruct ADC values to real world values 
 V_DCin = Reg[32] * V_Scale1;             // 
V_ADC*(3/4095) * (31.6e3/(1e6+31.6e3))^-1 
 V_PhA = ((Reg[33]*DSP_ADC_Scale)-0.9)*R_Div_Scale3;  // 
[(V_ADC*(3/4095))-0.9] * (13.7e3/(1e6+13.7e3))^-1 
 V_PhB = ((Reg[34]*DSP_ADC_Scale)-0.9)*R_Div_Scale3;  // 
[(V_ADC*(3/4095))-0.9] * (13.7e3/(1e6+13.7e3))^-1 
 V_PhC = ((Reg[35]*DSP_ADC_Scale)-0.9)*R_Div_Scale3;  // 
[(V_ADC*(3/4095))-0.9] * (13.7e3/(1e6+13.7e3))^-1 
 V_Buck = Reg[36] * V_Scale1;             // 
V_ADC*(3/4095) * (31.6e3/(1e6+31.6e3))^-1 
 V_Boost = Reg[37] * V_Scale1;             // 
V_ADC*(3/4095) * (31.6e3/(1e6+31.6e3))^-1 
 I_DCin = (Reg[38]*I_Scale1)-13.5;            // [V_ADC*(5/4095) * 
(185mV/A)^-1] -13.5 
 V_Pot = Reg[39] * DSP_ADC_Scale * R_Div_Scale2;      // 
V_ADC*(3/4095) 
 I_DCin2 = (Reg[40]*I_Scale2)-13.5;            // [V_ADC*(5/4095) * 
(185mV/A)^-1] -13.5 
 I_L1 = (Reg[41]*I_Scale2)-13.5 ;            // [V_ADC*(5/4095) * 
(185mV/A)^-1] -13.5 
 I_L2 = (Reg[42]*I_Scale2)-13.5 ;            // [V_ADC*(5/4095) * 
(185mV/A)^-1] -13.5 
 I_L3 = (Reg[43]*I_Scale2)-13.5 ;            // [V_ADC*(5/4095) * 
(185mV/A)^-1] -13.5 
 I_Buck = (Reg[44]*I_Scale2)-13.5 ;            // [V_ADC*(5/4095) * 
(185mV/A)^-1] -13.5 
 I_Boost = (Reg[45]*I_Scale2)-13.5 ;            // [V_ADC*(5/4095) * 
(185mV/A)^-1] -13.5 
 Ia = (Reg[46]*I_Scale2)-13.5 ;             // 
[V_ADC*(5/4095) * (185mV/A)^-1] -13.5 
 I_L5 =(Reg[47]*I_Scale2)-13.5 ;             // 
[V_ADC*(5/4095) * (185mV/A)^-1] -13.5 
 
 // Map scaled ADC values to itterable array 
 V_Scaled[0] = V_DCin; 
 V_Scaled[1] = V_PhA; 
 V_Scaled[2] = V_PhB; 
 V_Scaled[3] = V_PhC; 
 V_Scaled[4] = V_Buck; 
 V_Scaled[5] = V_Boost; 
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 V_Scaled[6] = I_DCin; 
 V_Scaled[7] = V_Pot; 
 V_Scaled[8] = I_DCin2; 
 V_Scaled[9] = I_L1; 
 V_Scaled[10] = I_L2; 
 V_Scaled[11] = I_L3; 
 V_Scaled[12] = I_Buck; 
 V_Scaled[13] = I_Boost; 
 V_Scaled[14] = Ia; 
 V_Scaled[15] = I_L5; 
 
 
 // Check Potentiometer and update LEDs based on voltage 
 if(V_Pot<1.0) 
 { 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO31 = 1;  //turn off 1st Red LED 
(Active Low) 
  GpioDataRegs.GPBSET.bit.GPIO34 = 1;  //turn off 2nd Red LED 
(Active Low) 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO10 = 1;   //turn off Board LED1 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO11 = 1;   //turn off Board LED2 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO12 = 1;   //turn off Board LED3 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO13 = 1;   //turn off Board LED4 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO24 = 1;   //turn off Board LED5 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO25 = 1;   //turn off Board LED6 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO26 = 1;   //turn off Board LED7 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO27 = 1;   //turn off Board LED8 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO8 = 1;   //turn off Board LED9 (Sw8 Active 
Low) 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO9 = 1;   //turn off Board LED10 (Sw8 Active 
Low) 
 } 
 else if(V_Pot>1.0 && V_Pot<2.0 ) 
 { 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO31 = 1; //turn on 1st Red LED 
  GpioDataRegs.GPBSET.bit.GPIO34 = 1;  //turn off 2nd Red LED 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO10 = 1;   //turn on Board LED1 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO11 = 1;   //turn on Board LED2 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO12 = 1;   //turn on Board LED3 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO13 = 1;   //turn on Board LED4 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO24 = 1;   //turn off Board LED5 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO25 = 1;   //turn off Board LED6 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO26 = 1;   //turn off Board LED7 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO27 = 1;   //turn off Board LED8 




  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO9 = 1;   //turn on Board LED10 (Sw8 Active 
Low) 
 } 
 else if(V_Pot>2.0 && V_Pot<2.5 ) 
 { 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO31 = 1; //turn on 1st Red LED 
  GpioDataRegs.GPBCLEAR.bit.GPIO34 = 1; //turn on 2nd Red LED 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO10 = 1;   //turn off Board LED1 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO11 = 1;   //turn off Board LED2 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO12 = 1;   //turn off Board LED3 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO13 = 1;   //turn off Board LED4 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO24 = 1;   //turn on Board LED5 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO25 = 1;   //turn on Board LED6 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO26 = 1;   //turn on Board LED7 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO27 = 1;   //turn on Board LED8 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO8 = 1;   //turn on Board LED9 (Sw8 Active 
Low) 





  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO31 = 1; //turn on 1st Red LED 
  GpioDataRegs.GPBCLEAR.bit.GPIO34 = 1; //turn on 2nd Red LED 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO10 = 1;   //turn on Board LED1 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO11 = 1;   //turn on Board LED2 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO12 = 1;   //turn on Board LED3 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO13 = 1;   //turn on Board LED4 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO24 = 1;   //turn on Board LED5 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO25 = 1;   //turn on Board LED6 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO26 = 1;   //turn on Board LED7 
  GpioDataRegs.GPASET.bit.GPIO27 = 1;   //turn on Board LED8 
  GpioDataRegs.GPACLEAR.bit.GPIO8 = 1;   //turn on Board LED9 (Sw8 Active 
Low) 




 // Create an AC reference 
 if(Sin_Counter >= Prd_Sw) //here we count to a number based on how many switching 
cycles occur for every fundamental cycle 
 { 






  Sin_Counter++; 
 } 
 
 //Feedforward Command to maintain magnitude of Inverter output as DC Input is varied. 
 Duty_AC = AC_Mag/V_DCin; 
 
 if(Duty_AC > 0.9) 
 { 
  Duty_AC = 0.9; 
 } 
 else if(Duty_AC < 0.0) 
 { 
  Duty_AC = 0.0; 
 } 
 
 Step_sin = (Sin_Counter/Prd_Sw)*pi_2; 
 Duty_AC = Duty_AC*PWM_TBPRD; 
 
 // Check SW1 Status and base motor rotation on reading 
 if(GpioDataRegs.GPADAT.bit.GPIO14 == 1) 
 { 
  Sine1 = ((sin(Step_sin+0)+1)/2)*Duty_AC; 
  Sine2 = ((sin(Step_sin-phase_offset)+1)/2)*Duty_AC; 




  Sine1 = ((sin(Step_sin+0)+1)/2)*Duty_AC; 
  Sine3 = ((sin(Step_sin-phase_offset)+1)/2)*Duty_AC; 




 uk1 = DCL_runPI(&pi1, Buck_Cmd, V_Buck); 
 uk2 = DCL_runPI(&pi2, Boost_Cmd, V_Boost); 
 
 ////Update Duty Cycle for Buck Converter 
 //EPwm1Regs.CMPA.half.CMPA= (Uint16) (DC_Buck*PWM_TBPRD); 
 
 EPwm4Regs.CMPA.half.CMPA= (Uint16) (uk1); 
 
 ////Update Duty Cycle for Boost Converter 
 //EPwm1Regs.CMPB = (Uint16) (DC_Boost*PWM_TBPRD); 
 




 //Update Duty Cycle for 3-phase inverter 
    EPwm1Regs.CMPA.half.CMPA = (Uint16) Sine1; 
 EPwm2Regs.CMPA.half.CMPA = (Uint16) Sine2; 
 EPwm3Regs.CMPA.half.CMPA = (Uint16) Sine3; 
 
   // Reinitialize for next ADC sequence 
   AdcRegs.ADCTRL2.bit.RST_SEQ1 = 1;         // Reset SEQ1 
   AdcRegs.ADCST.bit.INT_SEQ1_CLR = 1;       // Clear INT SEQ1 bit 
   PieCtrlRegs.PIEACK.all = PIEACK_GROUP1;   // Acknowledge interrupt to PIE 
 





    EPwm1Regs.TBCTL.bit.CTRMODE = TB_COUNT_UPDOWN; 
    EPwm1Regs.TBPRD = PWM_TBPRD;                 // Period = 2* 1000 TBCLK 
counts => 30 kHz 
 
    EPwm1Regs.TBCTL.bit.PHSEN = TB_DISABLE;         // Enable phase loading 
    EPwm1Regs.TBPHS.half.TBPHS = 0; 
    EPwm1Regs.TBCTL.bit.PHSDIR = TB_DOWN; 
    EPwm1Regs.TBCTL.bit.PRDLD = TB_SHADOW; 
    EPwm1Regs.TBCTL.bit.SYNCOSEL = TB_CTR_ZERO;  //Sync down-stream module 
    EPwm1Regs.TBCTR = 0x0000;                    // Clear counter 
    EPwm1Regs.TBCTL.bit.HSPCLKDIV = TB_DIV1;        // Clock ratio to 
SYSCLKOUT 
    EPwm1Regs.TBCTL.bit.CLKDIV = TB_DIV1; 
 
    EPwm1Regs.CMPCTL.bit.SHDWAMODE = CC_SHADOW;     // Load registers every 
ZERO 
    EPwm1Regs.CMPCTL.bit.SHDWBMODE = CC_SHADOW; 
    EPwm1Regs.CMPCTL.bit.LOADAMODE = CC_CTR_ZERO; 
    EPwm1Regs.CMPCTL.bit.LOADBMODE = CC_CTR_ZERO; 
 
    // Setup compare 
    EPwm1Regs.CMPA.half.CMPA = 0; 
    EPwm1Regs.CMPB = 0; 
 
 // Set actions 
    EPwm1Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAU = AQ_CLEAR; 
    EPwm1Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAD = AQ_SET; 
    EPwm1Regs.AQCTLB.bit.CBU = AQ_CLEAR; 





 // Setup Deadband 
    EPwm1Regs.DBCTL.bit.OUT_MODE = DB_FULL_ENABLE; 
    EPwm1Regs.DBCTL.bit.POLSEL = DB_ACTV_HIC; 
    EPwm1Regs.DBCTL.bit.IN_MODE = DBA_ALL; 
    EPwm1Regs.DBRED = 45;  //30; 
    EPwm1Regs.DBFED = 45;  //30; 
 
 
 //ADC Triggering Setup 
    EPwm1Regs.ETSEL.bit.SOCAEN = 1; 
    EPwm1Regs.ETSEL.bit.SOCASEL = 0x2;//2;//0x2;       // Select SOC from from CPMA 
on Period 





    EPwm2Regs.TBCTL.bit.CTRMODE = TB_COUNT_UPDOWN; 
    EPwm2Regs.TBPRD = PWM_TBPRD;                  // Period = 2*1000 
TBCLK counts => 30 kHz 
    EPwm2Regs.TBCTL.bit.PHSEN = TB_DISABLE;          // Enable phase 
loading 
    EPwm2Regs.TBPHS.half.TBPHS = 0; 
    EPwm2Regs.TBCTL.bit.PHSDIR = TB_DOWN; 
    EPwm2Regs.TBCTL.bit.PRDLD = TB_SHADOW; 
    EPwm2Regs.TBCTL.bit.SYNCOSEL = TB_SYNC_IN; // sync flow-through 
    EPwm2Regs.TBCTR = 0x0000;                  // Clear counter 
    EPwm2Regs.TBCTL.bit.HSPCLKDIV = TB_DIV1;       // Clock ratio to SYSCLKOUT 
    EPwm2Regs.TBCTL.bit.CLKDIV = TB_DIV1; 
 
    EPwm2Regs.CMPCTL.bit.SHDWAMODE = CC_SHADOW;    // Load registers every 
ZERO 
    EPwm2Regs.CMPCTL.bit.SHDWBMODE = CC_SHADOW; 
    EPwm2Regs.CMPCTL.bit.LOADAMODE = CC_CTR_ZERO; 
    EPwm2Regs.CMPCTL.bit.LOADBMODE = CC_CTR_ZERO; 
 
    // Setup compare 
    EPwm2Regs.CMPA.half.CMPA = 0; //fixed 50% duty cycle 
    EPwm2Regs.CMPB = 0; 
 
    // Set actions qualifiers 
    EPwm2Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAU = AQ_CLEAR; 
    EPwm2Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAD = AQ_SET; 
    EPwm2Regs.AQCTLB.bit.CBU = AQ_CLEAR; 




    //EPwm2Regs.ETSEL.bit.SOCAEN = 0;        // Disable SOC on A group 
 
 
 // Setup Deadband 
    EPwm2Regs.DBCTL.bit.OUT_MODE = DB_FULL_ENABLE; 
    EPwm2Regs.DBCTL.bit.POLSEL = DB_ACTV_HIC; 
    EPwm2Regs.DBCTL.bit.IN_MODE = DBA_ALL; 
    EPwm2Regs.DBRED = DeadTime; 






    EPwm3Regs.TBCTL.bit.CTRMODE = TB_COUNT_UPDOWN; 
    EPwm3Regs.TBPRD = PWM_TBPRD;               // Period = 2*1000 TBCLK counts => 
30 kHz 
    EPwm3Regs.TBCTL.bit.PHSEN = TB_DISABLE; 
    EPwm3Regs.TBPHS.half.TBPHS = 0; 
    EPwm3Regs.TBCTL.bit.PHSDIR = TB_DOWN; 
    EPwm3Regs.TBCTL.bit.PRDLD = TB_SHADOW; 
    EPwm3Regs.TBCTL.bit.SYNCOSEL = TB_SYNC_IN;  // sync flow-through 
    EPwm3Regs.TBCTR = 0x0000;                   // Clear counter 
    EPwm3Regs.TBCTL.bit.HSPCLKDIV = TB_DIV1;  // Clock ratio to 
SYSCLKOUT 
    EPwm3Regs.TBCTL.bit.CLKDIV = TB_DIV1; 
 
    // Setup shadow register load on ZERO 
    EPwm3Regs.CMPCTL.bit.SHDWAMODE = CC_SHADOW; 
    EPwm3Regs.CMPCTL.bit.SHDWBMODE = CC_SHADOW; 
    EPwm3Regs.CMPCTL.bit.LOADAMODE = CC_CTR_ZERO; 
    EPwm3Regs.CMPCTL.bit.LOADBMODE = CC_CTR_ZERO; 
 
    // Set Compare values 
    EPwm3Regs.CMPA.half.CMPA = 0;    // Set compare A value 
    EPwm3Regs.CMPB = 0; 
 
    // Set action qualifiers 
    EPwm3Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAU = AQ_CLEAR; 
    EPwm3Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAD = AQ_SET; 
    EPwm3Regs.AQCTLB.bit.CBU = AQ_CLEAR; 
    EPwm3Regs.AQCTLB.bit.CBD = AQ_SET; 
 
    //EPwm3Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAU = AQ_SET; 
    //EPwm3Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAD = AQ_CLEAR; 
    //EPwm3Regs.AQCTLB.bit.CBU = AQ_SET; 
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    //EPwm3Regs.AQCTLB.bit.CBD = AQ_CLEAR; 
 
 // Setup Deadband 
    EPwm3Regs.DBCTL.bit.OUT_MODE = DB_FULL_ENABLE; 
    EPwm3Regs.DBCTL.bit.POLSEL = DB_ACTV_HIC; 
    EPwm3Regs.DBCTL.bit.IN_MODE = DBA_ALL; 
    EPwm3Regs.DBRED = DeadTime; 







    EPwm4Regs.TBCTL.bit.CTRMODE = TB_COUNT_UPDOWN; 
    EPwm4Regs.TBPRD = PWM_TBPRD;               // Period = 2*1000 TBCLK counts => 
30 kHz 
    EPwm4Regs.TBCTL.bit.PHSEN = TB_DISABLE; 
    EPwm4Regs.TBPHS.half.TBPHS = 0; 
    EPwm4Regs.TBCTL.bit.PHSDIR = TB_DOWN; 
    EPwm4Regs.TBCTL.bit.PRDLD = TB_SHADOW; 
    EPwm4Regs.TBCTL.bit.SYNCOSEL = TB_SYNC_IN;  // sync flow-through 
    EPwm4Regs.TBCTR = 0x0000;                   // Clear counter 
    EPwm4Regs.TBCTL.bit.HSPCLKDIV = TB_DIV1;  // Clock ratio to 
SYSCLKOUT 
    EPwm4Regs.TBCTL.bit.CLKDIV = TB_DIV1; 
 
    // Setup shadow register load on ZERO 
    EPwm4Regs.CMPCTL.bit.SHDWAMODE = CC_SHADOW; 
    EPwm4Regs.CMPCTL.bit.SHDWBMODE = CC_SHADOW; 
    EPwm4Regs.CMPCTL.bit.LOADAMODE = CC_CTR_ZERO; 
    EPwm4Regs.CMPCTL.bit.LOADBMODE = CC_CTR_ZERO; 
 
    // Set Compare values 
    EPwm4Regs.CMPA.half.CMPA = 0;    // Set compare A value 
    EPwm4Regs.CMPB = 0; 
 
    // Set action qualifiers 
    EPwm4Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAU = AQ_CLEAR; 
    EPwm4Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAD = AQ_SET; 
    EPwm4Regs.AQCTLB.bit.CBU = AQ_CLEAR; 
    EPwm4Regs.AQCTLB.bit.CBD = AQ_SET; 
 
    //EPwm4Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAU = AQ_SET; 
    //EPwm4Regs.AQCTLA.bit.CAD = AQ_CLEAR; 
    //EPwm4Regs.AQCTLB.bit.CBU = AQ_SET; 
91 
 
    //EPwm4Regs.AQCTLB.bit.CBD = AQ_CLEAR; 
 
 // Setup Deadband 
//    EPwm4Regs.DBCTL.bit.OUT_MODE = DB_FULL_ENABLE; 
//    EPwm4Regs.DBCTL.bit.POLSEL = DB_ACTV_HIC; 
//    EPwm4Regs.DBCTL.bit.IN_MODE = DBA_ALL; 
//    EPwm4Regs.DBRED = DeadTime; 





//// Test 1,SCIA  DLB, 8-bit word, baud rate 0x000F, default, 1 STOP bit, no parity 
//void scia_echoback_init() 
//{ 
//    // Note: Clocks were turned on to the SCIA peripheral 
//    // in the InitSysCtrl() function 
// 
//  SciaRegs.SCICCR.all =0x0007;   // 1 stop bit,  No loopback 
//                                   // No parity,8 char bits, 
//                                   // async mode, idle-line protocol 
// SciaRegs.SCICTL1.all =0x0003;  // enable TX, RX, internal SCICLK, 
//                                   // Disable RX ERR, SLEEP, TXWAKE 
// SciaRegs.SCICTL2.all =0x0003; 
// SciaRegs.SCICTL2.bit.TXINTENA =1; 
// SciaRegs.SCICTL2.bit.RXBKINTENA =1; 
// #if (CPU_FRQ_150MHZ) 
//       SciaRegs.SCIHBAUD    =0x0001;  // 9600 baud @LSPCLK = 37.5MHz. 
//       SciaRegs.SCILBAUD    =0x00E7; 
// #endif 
// #if (CPU_FRQ_100MHZ) 
//      SciaRegs.SCIHBAUD    =0x0001;  // 9600 baud @LSPCLK = 20MHz. 
//      SciaRegs.SCILBAUD    =0x0044; 
// #endif 
// SciaRegs.SCICTL1.all =0x0023;  // Relinquish SCI from Reset 
//} 
// 
//// Transmit a character from the SCI 
//void scia_xmit(int a) 
//{ 
//    while (SciaRegs.SCIFFTX.bit.TXFFST != 0) {} 
//    SciaRegs.SCITXBUF=a; 
//} 
// 




//    int i; 
//    i = 0; 
//    while(msg[i] != '\0') 
//    { 
//        scia_xmit(msg[i]); 
//        i++; 
//    } 
//} 
// 
//// Initialize the SCI FIFO 
//void scia_fifo_init() 
//{ 
//    SciaRegs.SCIFFTX.all=0xE040; 
//    SciaRegs.SCIFFRX.all=0x204f; 





A-2 CPLD VHDL Code 
A-2-1 Main Top Function 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Company:  University of Arkansas (NCREPT) 
-- Engineer: Nicholas Blair 
--  
-- Create Date:  12Mar2020 
-- Design Name:   CPLD_CSPR_v1 
-- Module Name:   CPLD_CSPR_v1 - Behavioral 
-- Project Name:   CPLD_CSPR_v1 
-- Target Devices:   LCMXO2-7000HC-4FG484C (UCB v1.3a) 
-- Tool versions:   Lattice Diamond_x64 Build 3.10.2.115.1 
-- Description:  
-- This Project was developed to demonstrate a system-level design which incorperates shared 
registers and communications. 
-- Eight individual on-board LEDs will be controlled via a simple PWM interface. 




-- Signal   CPLD_Pin Description 
-- LED_1   R17   LED1   (Output) 
-- LED_2   T18   LED2   (Output) 
-- LED_3   R16   LED3   (Output) 
-- LED_4   T17   LED4   (Output) 
-- LED_5   Y21   LED5   (Output) 
-- LED_6   Y20   LED6   (Output) 
-- LED_7   U18   LED7   (Output) 
-- LED_8   U17   LED8   (Output) 
-- PWM_Test_Out  K2   PWM Test  (Output) 
-- Usr_TX   W1   Serial-TX  (Output) 


























entity CPLD_Modbus_Top is 
    Port ( 
 
    ---- UCB TI FTDI Serial Interface 
    TI_RX_Slave : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- Serial In for User 
Control 
    TI_TX_Slave : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- Serial Out for User 
Control 
    ---- UCB XPORT Ethernet Interface 
    XPORT_TX : in STD_LOGIC;   -- Serial In for 
XPORT Comms 
    XPORT_RX : out STD_LOGIC;   -- Serial Out 
for XPORT Comms 
--    XPORT_RTS : in STD_LOGIC;   -- Request to 
Send for XPORT Comms 
--    XPORT_DTR : in STD_LOGIC;   -- Data 
Terminal Ready for XPORT Comms 
--    XPORT_CTS : out STD_LOGIC;   -- Clear to 
Send for XPORT Comms 
    ---- UCB DIP Switches 
    SW_1 : in  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board DIP 
Switch 
    SW_2 : in  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board DIP 
Switch 
    SW_3 : in  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board DIP 
Switch 
    SW_4 : in  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board DIP 
Switch 
    ---- UCB Push Buttons 
    BTN_1 : in  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board Push 
Button 




    BTN_3 : in  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board Push 
Button 
    BTN_4 : in  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board Push 
Button 
    ---- UCB Board LEDs 
    LED_1 : out  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board LED  
    LED_2 : out  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board LED  
    LED_3 : out  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board LED  
    LED_4 : out  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board LED  
    LED_5 : out  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board LED  
    LED_6 : out  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board LED  
    LED_7 : out  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board LED  
    LED_8 : out  STD_LOGIC;    -- Board LED 
    ---- UCB SPI ADC1 
    ADC1_SCLK : out  STD_LOGIC;   -- Serial SPI 
Clock 
    ADC1_DIN : out  STD_LOGIC;   -- Serial SPI 
ADC Data In 
    ADC1_CS :out  STD_LOGIC;   -- Serial SPI 
ADC Chip Select 
    ADC1_DOUT : in  STD_LOGIC;   -- Serial SPI 
ADC Data Out 
    ---- UCB SPI ADC2 
    ADC2_SCLK : out  STD_LOGIC;   -- Serial SPI 
Clock 
    ADC2_DIN : out  STD_LOGIC;   -- Serial SPI 
ADC Data In 
    ADC2_CS :out  STD_LOGIC;   -- Serial SPI 
ADC Chip Select 
    ADC2_DOUT : in  STD_LOGIC;   -- Serial SPI 
ADC Data Out 
    ---- DIMM_B Serial Interface 
    DIMM_B_SCI_RX : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- DSP B 
Serial RX (DIMM_B_GPIO_28) 
    DIMM_B_SCI_TX : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DSP B 
Serial TX (DIMM_B_GPIO_29) 
    ---- DIMM_B GPIO Pins 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_00 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_01 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_02 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 




    DIMM_B_GPIO_04 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_05 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_06 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_07 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_08 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_09 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_10 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_11 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_12 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_13 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_14 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_15 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_16 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_17 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_18 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_19 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_20 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_21 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_22 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_23 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_24 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_25 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 




    DIMM_B_GPIO_27 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    --DIMM_B_GPIO_28 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    --DIMM_B_GPIO_29 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_30 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_31 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_32 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_33 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_34 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_48 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_49 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_58 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_59 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_60 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_61 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_62 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_63 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
 
    ---- IDC_A GPIO Pins 
    IDC_A_GPIO_00 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_01 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_02 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_03 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_04 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 




    IDC_A_GPIO_06 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_07 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_08 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_09 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_10 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_11 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_12 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_13 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_14 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_15 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_16 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_17 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_18 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_19 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_20 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_21 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_22 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_23 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_24 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_25 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_26 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_27 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    ---- IDC_B GPIO Pins 
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    IDC_B_GPIO_00 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_01 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_02 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_03 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_04 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_05 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_06 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_07 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_08 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_09 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_10 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_11 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_12 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_13 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_14 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_15 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_16 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_17 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_18 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_19 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_20 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_21 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 




    IDC_B_GPIO_23 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_24 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_25 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_26 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_B_GPIO_27 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_B 
Connector GPIO 
 
     ); 
end CPLD_Modbus_Top; 
 
architecture Behavioral of CPLD_Modbus_Top is  
begin 
  
 -- Main Routing Process (Combinatorial) 












  begin 
   if (SW_1 = '1') then 
    -- DIMM_B Active 
    -- For Routing Serial Communications 
    DIMM_B_SCI_RX <= TI_RX_Slave; -- Send Data 
Recieved from On-Board FTDI serial interface to DSP 
    TI_TX_Slave <= DIMM_B_SCI_TX; -- Send Data 
Recieved from DSP to On-Board FTDI serial interface 
    if(SW_2 = '1') then 
     --IDC_A is Primary and IDC_B is Secondary 
     IDC_A_GPIO_00 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_00 AND 
NOT(DIMM_B_GPIO_01); 
     IDC_A_GPIO_01 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_01 AND 
NOT(DIMM_B_GPIO_00); 




     IDC_A_GPIO_03 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_03 AND 
NOT(DIMM_B_GPIO_02); 
     IDC_A_GPIO_04 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_04 AND 
NOT(DIMM_B_GPIO_05); 
     IDC_A_GPIO_05 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_05 AND 
NOT(DIMM_B_GPIO_04); 
     IDC_A_GPIO_06 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_06; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_07 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_07; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_08 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_08; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_09 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_09; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_10 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_10; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_11 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_11; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_12 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_12; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_13 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_13; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_14 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_14; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_15 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_15; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_16 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_16; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_17 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_17; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_18 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_18; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_19 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_19; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_20 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_20; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_21 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_21; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_22 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_22; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_23 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_23; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_24 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_24; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_25 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_25; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_26 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_26; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_27 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_27; 
     --IDC_B_GPIO is set to Secondary 
     IDC_B_GPIO_00 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_30; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_01 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_31; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_02 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_32; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_03 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_33; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_04 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_34; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_05 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_48; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_06 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_49; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_07 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_58; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_08 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_59; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_09 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_60; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_10 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_61; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_11 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_62; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_12 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_63; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_13 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_14 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_15 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_16 <= '0'; 
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     IDC_B_GPIO_17 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_18 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_19 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_20 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_21 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_22 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_23 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_24 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_25 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_26 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_27 <= '0'; 
    else 
     --IDC_B is Primary and IDC_A is Secondary 
     IDC_B_GPIO_00 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_00; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_01 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_01; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_02 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_02; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_03 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_03; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_04 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_04; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_05 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_05; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_06 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_06; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_07 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_07; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_08 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_08; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_09 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_09; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_10 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_10; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_11 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_11; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_12 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_12; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_13 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_13; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_14 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_14; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_15 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_15; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_16 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_16; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_17 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_17; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_18 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_18; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_19 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_19; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_20 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_20; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_21 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_21; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_22 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_22; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_23 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_23; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_24 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_24; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_25 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_25; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_26 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_26; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_27 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_27; 
     --IDC_A_GPIO is set to Secondary 
     IDC_A_GPIO_00 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_30; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_01 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_31; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_02 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_32; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_03 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_33; 
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     IDC_A_GPIO_04 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_34; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_05 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_48; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_06 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_49; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_07 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_58; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_08 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_59; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_09 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_60; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_10 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_61; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_11 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_62; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_12 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_63; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_13 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_14 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_15 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_16 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_17 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_18 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_19 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_20 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_21 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_22 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_23 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_24 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_25 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_26 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_27 <= '0'; 
    end if; 
      
   else 
    -- DIMM_B Active 
    -- For Routing Serial Communications 
    DIMM_B_SCI_RX <= XPORT_TX; -- Send Data Recieved from 
XPort Server to DSP 
    XPORT_RX <= DIMM_B_SCI_TX; -- Send Data Recieved from 
DSP to XPort Server 
    if(SW_2 = '1') then 
     --IDC_A is Primary and IDC_B is Secondary 
     IDC_A_GPIO_00 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_00; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_01 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_01; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_02 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_02; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_03 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_03; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_04 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_04; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_05 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_05; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_06 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_06; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_07 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_07; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_08 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_08; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_09 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_09; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_10 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_10; 
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     IDC_A_GPIO_11 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_11; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_12 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_12; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_13 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_13; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_14 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_14; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_15 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_15; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_16 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_16; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_17 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_17; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_18 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_18; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_19 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_19; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_20 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_20; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_21 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_21; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_22 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_22; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_23 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_23; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_24 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_24; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_25 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_25; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_26 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_26; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_27 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_27; 
     --IDC_B_GPIO is set to Secondary 
     IDC_B_GPIO_00 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_30; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_01 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_31; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_02 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_32; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_03 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_33; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_04 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_34; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_05 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_48; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_06 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_49; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_07 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_58; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_08 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_59; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_09 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_60; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_10 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_61; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_11 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_62; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_12 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_63; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_13 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_14 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_15 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_16 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_17 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_18 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_19 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_20 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_21 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_22 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_23 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_24 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_25 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_26 <= '0'; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_27 <= '0'; 
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    else 
     --IDC_B is Primary and IDC_A is Secondary 
     IDC_B_GPIO_00 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_00; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_01 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_01; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_02 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_02; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_03 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_03; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_04 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_04; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_05 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_05; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_06 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_06; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_07 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_07; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_08 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_08; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_09 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_09; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_10 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_10; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_11 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_11; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_12 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_12; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_13 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_13; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_14 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_14; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_15 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_15; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_16 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_16; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_17 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_17; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_18 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_18; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_19 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_19; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_20 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_20; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_21 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_21; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_22 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_22; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_23 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_23; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_24 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_24; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_25 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_25; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_26 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_26; 
     IDC_B_GPIO_27 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_27; 
     --IDC_A_GPIO is set to Secondary 
     IDC_A_GPIO_00 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_30; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_01 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_31; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_02 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_32; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_03 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_33; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_04 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_34; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_05 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_48; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_06 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_49; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_07 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_58; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_08 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_59; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_09 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_60; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_10 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_61; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_11 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_62; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_12 <= DIMM_B_GPIO_63; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_13 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_14 <= '0'; 
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     IDC_A_GPIO_15 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_16 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_17 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_18 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_19 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_20 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_21 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_22 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_23 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_24 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_25 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_26 <= '0'; 
     IDC_A_GPIO_27 <= '0'; 
    end if; 
     
   end if; 
    
    -- For Testing Onboard Buttons, Switches, and LEDs. 
    LED_1 <= BTN_1; 
    LED_2 <= BTN_2; 
    LED_3 <= BTN_3; 
    LED_4 <= BTN_4; 
    LED_5 <= SW_1; 
    LED_6 <= SW_2; 
    LED_7 <= SW_3; 
    LED_8 <= SW_4; 
     
    



















architecture Behavioral of CPLD_Testbench is 
 
 COMPONENT CPLD_Modbus_Top 
  PORT ( 
 
    ---- DIMM_B GPIO Pins 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_00 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_01 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_02 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_03 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 
    DIMM_B_GPIO_04 : in  STD_LOGIC;  -- DIMM_B 
Connector GPIO 




    ---- IDC_A GPIO Pins 
    IDC_A_GPIO_00 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_01 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_02 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_03 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_04 : out  STD_LOGIC;  -- IDC_A 
Connector GPIO 
    IDC_A_GPIO_05 : out  STD_LOGIC   -- IDC_A Connector 
GPIO 
     ); 
 END COMPONENT; 
 
 SIGNAL s_CLK : STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_IDC_A_GPIO_00 : STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_IDC_A_GPIO_01 : STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_IDC_A_GPIO_02 : STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_IDC_A_GPIO_03 : STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_IDC_A_GPIO_04 : STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_IDC_A_GPIO_05 : STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_DIMM_B_GPIO_00 :  STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_DIMM_B_GPIO_01 :  STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
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 SIGNAL s_DIMM_B_GPIO_02 :  STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_DIMM_B_GPIO_03 :  STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_DIMM_B_GPIO_04 :  STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 SIGNAL s_DIMM_B_GPIO_05 :  STD_LOGIC := '0'; 
 
  
constant CLK : TIME := 10ns; 
 
begin  
 UUT: CPLD_Modbus_Top PORT MAP( 
 --INPUTS 
 IDC_A_GPIO_00 => s_IDC_A_GPIO_00, 
 IDC_A_GPIO_01 => s_IDC_A_GPIO_01, 
 IDC_A_GPIO_02 => s_IDC_A_GPIO_02, 
 IDC_A_GPIO_03 => s_IDC_A_GPIO_03, 
 IDC_A_GPIO_04 => s_IDC_A_GPIO_04, 
 IDC_A_GPIO_05 => s_IDC_A_GPIO_05, 
  
 --OUTPUTS  
 DIMM_B_GPIO_00 => s_DIMM_B_GPIO_00, 
 DIMM_B_GPIO_01 => s_DIMM_B_GPIO_01, 
 DIMM_B_GPIO_02 => s_DIMM_B_GPIO_02, 
 DIMM_B_GPIO_03 => s_DIMM_B_GPIO_03, 
 DIMM_B_GPIO_04 => s_DIMM_B_GPIO_04, 





--  s_CLK_I<='1'; 
--  wait for CLK/2; 
--  s_CLK_I<='0'; 
--  wait for CLK/2; 




 begin  
  wait for 100ns; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_00 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_01 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_02 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_03 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_04 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_05 <= '0'; 
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  wait for 100ns;  
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_00 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_01 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_02 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_03 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_04 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_05 <= '0'; 
   
   
  wait for 100ns;  
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_00 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_01 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_02 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_03 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_04 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_05 <= '1'; 
   
  wait for 100ns;  
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_00 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_01 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_02 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_03 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_04 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_05 <= '1'; 
   
    wait for 100ns;  
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_00 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_01 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_02 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_03 <= '1'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_04 <= '0'; 
  s_DIMM_B_GPIO_05 <= '1'; 
   
 END PROCESS; 
   
end Behavioral; 
 
A-3 Web Server Python Code 
# This file handles the communication for modbus 
import minimalmodbus 
# Port name, slave address (in decimal) 
instrument = minimalmodbus.Instrument('/dev/ttyUSB0',1) 
 
# Serial Port Name 
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instrument.serial.port = '/dev/ttyUSB0' 
 
# Baud Rate 
instrument.serial.baudrate = 115200 
 
# Byte size 
instrument.serial.bytesize = 8 
 
# Stop Bits 
instrument.serial.stopbits = 2 
 
# Slave Address 
instrument.address 
 
# RTU or ASCII Mode 
instrument.mode = minimalmodbus.MODE_RTU 
 
# Clear Buffer Before Each Transaction 
instrument.clear_buffers_before_each_transaction = True 
 
# Timeout (in seconds) 
instrument.serial.timeout = 2 
 
# To Display Current Settings 
print("Slave Address:", instrument.address) 
print("Port Name:", instrument.serial.port) 
print("Mode:", minimalmodbus.MODE_RTU) 
print("Baud Rate:", instrument.serial.baudrate) 
print("Byte Size:", instrument.serial.bytesize) 
print("Parity:", instrument.serial.parity) 




    print("In serial function") 
    #s = 2 
    #t = 8 
    #instrument.write_register(int(s), int(t), 0) 
    #i = 0 
 
    # Registers 0-31 allocated as read registers 
    V_DCin = instrument.read_register(4,0) 
    V_PhA = instrument.read_register(5,0) 
    V_PhB = instrument.read_register(6,0) 
    V_PhC = instrument.read_register(7,0) 
    V_Buck = instrument.read_register(8,0) 
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    V_Boost = instrument.read_register(9,0) 
    I_DCin = instrument.read_register(10,0) 
    V_Pot = instrument.read_register(11,0) 
    I_DCin2 = instrument.read_register(12,0) 
    I_L1 = instrument.read_register(13,0) 
    I_L2 = instrument.read_register(14,0) 
    I_L3 = instrument.read_register(15,0) 
    I_Buck = instrument.read_register(16,0) 
    I_Boost = instrument.read_register(17,0) 
    Ia = instrument.read_register(18,0) 
    I_L5 = instrument.read_register(19,0) 
 
    arr = [V_DCin, V_PhA, V_PhB, V_PhC, V_Buck, V_Boost, I_DCin, V_Pot, I_DCin2, I_L1, 
I_L2, I_L3, I_Buck, I_Boost, Ia, I_L5] 
 
    print(arr) 
    return arr 
 
def mod_write(arr): 
     
    # arr = [myfreq, mybuck, myboost, myvac, myvacfund, mybuckkp, mybuckki, myboostkp, 
myboostki] 
    print("In Modbus Write Function") 
 
    a = int(format(30,"b")+'00000',2) 
    print(a)  
 
    arr[0] = int(format(int(arr[0]),"b")+'00000',2) 
    arr[1] = int(format(int(arr[1]),"b")+'00000',2) 
    arr[2] = int(format(int(arr[2]),"b")+'00000',2) 
    arr[3] = int(format(int(arr[3]),"b")+'00000',2) 
    arr[4] = int(format(int(arr[4]),"b")+'00000',2) 
    arr[5] = int(format(int(arr[5]),"b")+'00000',2) 
    arr[6] = int(format(int(arr[6]),"b")+'00000',2) 
    arr[7] = int(format(int(arr[7]),"b")+'00000',2) 
    arr[8] = int(format(int(arr[8]),"b")+'00000',2) 
 
    # Registers 32-63 allocated as write registers 
    instrument.write_register(20, int(arr[0]), 0) 
    instrument.write_register(21, int(arr[1]), 0) 
    instrument.write_register(22, int(arr[2]), 0) 
    instrument.write_register(23, int(arr[3]), 0) 
    instrument.write_register(24, int(arr[4]), 0) 
    instrument.write_register(25, int(arr[5]), 0) 
    instrument.write_register(26, int(arr[6]), 0) 
    instrument.write_register(27, int(arr[7]), 0) 
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    instrument.write_register(28, int(arr[8]), 0) 
 
    print(arr) 
 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    mod_func() 
 
